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General Introduction
The past two decades have been an intriguing and exiting period for trade and la-
bor economists trying to better grasp the impact of globalization on labor markets.
The combination of major disruptions to the global economy, and the availability
of new data sets and new theories, has provided researchers a unique opportunity
to explore nuances in understanding the labor-market impact of trade at an un-
precedented level of detail. The primary objective of this thesis is therefore to
contributing to this lively and policy relevant literature.
Beginning in the 1990s, research by economists showed that skill-biased tech-
nical change, especially in the form of rapid automation of routine tasks, played
the leading role in the evolution of the wage structure in most advanced economies.
On the other hand, international trade, in the form of offshoring at first, was seen
to only modestly increase wage inequality. At that time, the attention was partic-
ularly centered on the United States and most of the data sets spanned the 1970s
and 1980s. (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999; Katz and Autor, 1999). Recent evidence
revealed that since the early 1990s, and most particularly since the late 1990s, ex-
panding global trade is playing a much larger role on advanced economies’ labor
markets. Part of the explanation lies in two different trends happening in the global
economy. Those two major developments and the exploration of parts of their
influence on the labor market form the common themes of this thesis.
First, we have witnessed an expansion of international trade, which has been
mainly propelled by the growing importance of developing countries in the global
economy and especially driven by China’s spectacular transition to a market-oriented
economy. The shift of global manufacturing production networks towards these
new global players represents a substantial competitive shock, applying renewed
pressure on high-wage countries’ labor markets. Production chains have become
more and more internationally fragmented, and the availability of cheaper labor
abroad might threaten workers and firms in industrialized countries. Part of this
issue is explored in the second chapter of my thesis, which looks at the medium-
term impact of increased imports from China on workers in the United Kingdom
(henceforth UK). In a similar and complementary manner, the third chapter ex-
plores the short-term effect of exposure to world trade shocks on wages of Swiss
manufacturing workers.
Second, the intensification of merchandise trade has also been accompanied
with a rise in bilateral imports and exports matched within sectors. Indeed, at least
xiii
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since the 1960s, the share of intra-industry trade (henceforth IIT) is on an upward
trend (Bru¨lhart, 2009). This is interesting at least for two reasons. First, rising IIT
shares suggest that national economies worldwide are converging towards similar
sector compositions, which in turn could be partially explained by the growing im-
portance of outward processing trade. Besides, increased shares of IIT could be
related to lower factor adjustment costs to trade shocks compared to expansions of
inter-industry trade. Indeed, if trade integration is mainly driven by the two-way
exchange of different varieties of a same sector, then the sectoral composition of
factors of production would be potentially less disturbed than if trade was hap-
pening across totally different sectors. Unlike inter-industry trade, the two-way
exchange of similar products could signal a complementarity in modes of produc-
tion that might prove beneficial to workers. The first chapter is tightly linked to
this issue, since it explores the relationship between expanding IIT and associated
worker reallocations both theoretically and empirically. Part of the second chapter
also presents new evidence of a positive impact of trade with the European Union,
which is mainly in the form of IIT, on workers in the UK.
In this thesis, consisting of three chapters, I have sought to explore these issues
with state-of-the-art scientific techniques. Because trade shocks play out in gen-
eral equilibrium, assessing their causal effects presents a conceptual and empirical
challenge. Thus, the thesis is especially focused on identifying the causal impact
of international trade on the labor market. To that end, each chapter presents an
identification strategy based on the use of instrumental variables.
The first chapter, written with Marius Bru¨lhart, explores the relation between
IIT expansion and associated worker flows, taking the latter as an indicator of
labor-market adjustment costs. IIT has long interested economists not just be-
cause of its incompatibility with neoclassical trade theory but also because of its
perceived benign nature. A sizable empirical literature has defined precisely and
tested empirically what has become known as the “smooth adjustment hypothesis”
(henceforth SAH), according to which IIT expansion is less disruptive than inter-
industry trade expansion. The SAH is intuitively compelling but remains rather
short of rigorous support and has not yet been couched in a general-equilibrium
trade model with pure trade shocks. The difficulty lies in finding a tractable setting
that allows both trade flows and factor-market reallocations to be intra-industry
and inter-industry to varying degrees, as an exogenous determinant of trade (such
as transport costs) is changed. Such a setting has been developed by Bernard, Red-
ding, and Schott (2007), where a differentiated-goods-heterogeneous-firms model
yielding intra-industry trade and labor adjustment is embedded in a comparative-
advantage framework that generates inter-industry trade and labor adjustment. We
show that this model lends itself to simulating inter-industry and intra-industry
trade adjustment to a pure trade shock. Moreover, in the empirical section, we seek
to improve on the existing literature by instrumenting IIT, which is shown in the
theoretical part to be potentially endogenous to productivity shocks. We find that
both theoretical and empirical analyses are consistent with the SAH, according to
which IIT expansion is less disruptive than inter-industry trade expansion.
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The second chapter, written with Marius Bru¨lhart and Joanne Lindley, contrasts
the impact of increased import competition coming from China and the European
Union (henceforth EU) on workers in the UK over a 15-year period. More specif-
ically, we explore the worker-level impact of increased import penetration in UK
manufacturing industries over the period 1997-2011. Our approach borrows the
identification strategy of a corresponding analysis for the United States by Autor,
Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014), which we extend in several directions. First, our
data permits us to decompose total earnings into hours of work and hourly pay,
assessing the relative contribution of each margin in the adjustment process. Sec-
ond, we look at net as well as gross imports, thus separately examining the effects
of increased IIT. Next, we focus on import penetration from EU countries in addi-
tion to China. We estimate worker-level outcomes separately by occupations, and
finally we look at the indirect impact of import competition on worker-level out-
comes along the value chain. The results revealed that gross and net import pene-
tration from China had significantly negative effects on workers’ earnings, wages
and hours of work in the affected industries. In contrast, increased gross imports
from the EU are associated with positive worker-level outcomes, which is largely
explained by the fact that increased imports from the EU were mostly offset by
increased same-industry exports to the EU. We also find that the adverse worker-
level effects of increased imports from China display great heterogeneity across
types of job. Finally, we find that increased imports from China exert additional
pressure on workers through spillovers to employment and wages in downstream
industries.
The third and last chapter is single-authored. I focus on the short-term impact
of exposure to trade and real exchange rate shocks on wages for Swiss manufac-
turing workers over the period 1996-2008. Particular effort is made to consistently
estimate the causal effect of trade and exchange rate shocks on wages in using
a gravity-type estimation strategy as a first-stage step to construct instrumental
variables. The findings show that industry exposure to trade and exchange rate
shocks influences wages of manufacturing workers of various groups differently.
The trade and exchange rate impacts are concentrated among high-skilled and blue-
collar workers almost exclusively. Additional evidence revealed that exchange rate
effects are potentially heterogeneous across industries with different market struc-
tures. Wages of workers employed in industries that predominantly produce homo-
geneous goods are shown to be more responsive to exchange rates movements than
those working in industries that predominantly produce differentiated varieties.
The three chapters follow.
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Chapter 1
Intra-Industry Trade Expansion
and Labor Reallocation: Theory
and Evidence*
MARIUS BRU¨LHART AND ARNAUD JOYE
We study the relation between intra-industry trade (IIT) and asso-
ciated worker flows, taking the latter as an indicator of labor-market
adjustment costs. Our paper proposes two main innovations. First,
we generate dynamic IIT in a general-equilibrium trade model featur-
ing heterogeneous firms, and we relate these trade patterns to intra-
and inter-industry job reallocations. Second, we test the relationship
between IIT and worker flows in panel data and using an instrumental-
variable strategy to account for the potential endogeneity of IIT. Our
instruments are based on industry-specific real exchange rate indices.
Both the theoretical and empirical analyses are consistent with the
“smooth adjustment hypothesis”, according to which IIT expansion
is less disruptive than inter-industry trade expansion. A pure intra-
industry trade shock is found to generate less than half as much between-
industry worker reallocation than a pure inter-industry trade shock.
JEL Classification: F1, J62, C25
Keywords: intra-industry trade, trade adjustment, job turnover, heterogeneous firms
*We thank the Swiss National Science Foundation for financial support (NCCR Trade Regulation,
and grant PDFMP1-123133).
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1.1 Introduction
Intra-industry trade (IIT) has long interested economists not just because of its
incompatibility with neoclassical trade theory but also because of its perceived
benign nature. Balassa (1966, p.472) famously conjectured that, in view of ris-
ing shares of IIT, “the difficulties of adjustment to freer trade have been gener-
ally overestimated”. A sizable empirical literature has since defined precisely and
tested empirically what has become known as the “smooth adjustment hypothesis”
(SAH). This literature has generally lent support to Balassa’s conjecture, and it is
therefore not surprising that IIT indices remain popular first-pass proxies for the
adjustment effects of trade expansion.1
The SAH is intuitively compelling but remains rather short of rigorous sup-
port. There has been considerable discussion on the appropriate measurement of
IIT, converging on the conclusion that in the context of trade-related adjustment,
measures of “marginal ”IIT (MIIT) are to be preferred to the standard Grubel and
Lloyd (1975) index. However, much of this literature has been based on informal
reasoning and ad hoc empirical specifications.
The SAH has not yet been couched in a general-equilibrium trade model with
pure trade shocks. The difficulty lies in finding a tractable setting that allows both
trade flows and factor-market reallocations to be intra-industry and inter-industry to
varying degrees, as an exogenous determinant of trade (such as transport costs) is
changed.2 Such a setting has been developed by Bernard, Redding, and Schott
(2007), where a differentiated-goods-heterogeneous-firms model yielding intra-
industry trade and adjustment is embedded in a comparative-advantage framework
that generates inter-industry trade and adjustment. We show that this model lends
itself to simulating inter-industry and intra-industry trade adjustment to a pure trade
shock.
The link between IIT and labor-market adjustment has been investigated empir-
ically in a number of prior studies.3 None of these analyses considered the possibil-
ity that (M)IIT might be endogenous with respect to domestic labor-market condi-
tions. We therefore seek to improve on the existing literature by instrumenting IIT.
Moreover, we complement existing studies by drawing on data for Switzerland,
which have not been analyzed in this context to date.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we present the theory and
our simulations of the SAH in general equilibrium. Section 1.3 presents our data,
our empirical model and the estimation results. Section 1.4 concludes.
1For recent policy-related work using IIT as a proxy for non-disruptive trade expansion, see e.g.
World Bank (2009), WTO-UNCTAD (2012), or Subramanian and Kessler (2013).
2Lovely and Nelson (2000) have shown that, in general equilibrium, MIIT can be associated with
inter-industry reallocation of factors if productivity is also allowed to change.
3See e.g. Bru¨lhart (2000), Bru¨lhart, Elliott, and Lindley (2006) or Cabral and Silva (2006).
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1.2 Theory
1.2.1 Trade and job reallocation in a heterogeneous-firms model
We couch our analysis in the trade model of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007)
(henceforth BRS). BRS extended the Melitz (2003) framework by adding compar-
ative advantage a` la Heckscher-Ohlin to firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium.
Assume two countries (Home and Foreign), two differentiated industries (in-
dustry 1 producing varieties of good 1 and industry 2 producing varieties of good
2), and two factors of production (skilled and unskilled labor, S and L). Good 1 is
assumed to be relatively skill intensive, and Home is assumed to be relatively skill
abundant.
Consumer preferences are identical and homothetic, with Cobb-Douglas upper-
tier utility across the two goods, and lower-tier utility taking the CES form over a
continuum of horizontally differentiated varieties. The Cobb-Douglas industry ex-
penditure shares are denoted αi. Production technology is assumed to be identical
in the two countries, with firms facing fixed costs and constant marginal costs that
depend on firm productivity. Technology is homothetic, as fixed and variable costs
are assumed to use the two types of labor with the same intensity.
An industry i consists of a continuum of competitive firms. Their sunk entry
cost fei takes the form:
fie(ωS)
βi(ωL)
1−βi , fei > 0,
where ωS and ωL stand for skilled and unskilled wage respectively, and βi repre-
sents the skilled labor intensity of sector i. At the time of decision, prospective
entrants face uncertainty about their productivity ϕ ∈ (0,∞). Once the entry cost
is borne, firms draw their productivity level from a common distribution function
g(ϕ), assumed to be Pareto with shape parameter a > 0. This productivity remains
unchanged over the lifetime of the firm. In each period, firms face an exogenous
probability of death, δ.
In order to produce its differentiated variety of good i, the firm faces recurrent
fixed and variable production costs that share the factor intensities of fei. The fixed
production cost, fi, is identical across firms, while the variable cost is proportional
to productivity ϕ. The presence of these production costs prevents some firms from
producing profitably and leads them to exit the industry immediately after entry.
Exporting entails additional fixed and variable costs, denoted by fix and τi > 1
respectively, and sharing the factor intensities of the entry and production costs.
Variable exporting costs take the standard iceberg form, meaning that a fraction
τi − 1 unit of a variety “melts” in transit. Again depending on the productivity
draws, some firms within each industry will choose optimally not to export as they
could not generate sufficient revenue to cover the fixed costs of exporting.
With profit maximization under monopolistic competition, both domestic and
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export prices, pid(ϕ) and pix(ϕ) respectively, depend on firm-specific productivity:
pix(ϕ) = τipid(ϕ) =
τi(ωS)
βi(ωL)
1−βi
ρϕ
,
where 0 < ρ < 1 captures the substitutability of varieties within an industry. Given
this pricing rule for each firm, equilibrium revenue in the export market, rix(ϕ),
is also proportional to that in the domestic one, rid(ϕ). Relative industry price
indices and relative country endowments have an impact on firm revenues such
that the latter is different across countries and sectors. Firm profits across the two
markets are also proportional and can be separately identified since no firm is ever
engaged in exporting without selling on the domestic market. These profits are
given by:
piid(ϕ) =
rid(ϕ)
ρ
− fi(ωS)βi(ωL)1−βi ,
piix(ϕ) =
rix(ϕ)
ρ
− fix(ωS)βi(ωL)1−βi ,
where σ = 1/(1− ρ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. The zero-profit produc-
tivity cut-off ϕi∗, below which firms will not embark on production is industry-
specific and given by:
rid(ϕ
∗
i ) = σfi(ωS)
βi(ωL)
1−βi .
Analogously, firms with draws above the exporting productivity cut-off, ϕix∗,
will serve both markets:
rix(ϕ
∗
ix) = σfix(ωS)
βi(ωL)
1−βi .
In each period, a mass of firms, Mei, enters the industry after having in-
curred the entry cost. A fraction G(ϕ∗i ) draws a productivity level below the
zero-profit productivity cut-off, ϕ∗i and leaves the industry right away. A frac-
tion G(ϕ∗ix) − G(ϕ∗i ) produces for the domestic market only, and the remaining
fraction 1−G(ϕ∗ix) also engage in exporting.
Goods and labor markets need to clear in both countries. The steady-state
equilibrium is characterized by a stable mass of entering firms, Mei, and a stable
mass of active firms within the industry, Mi. As in Melitz (2003), the mass of
entering firms that are productive enough to survive must equal the mass of firms
that exogenously dies.
Trade shocks have heterogeneous effects across firms. A fall in variable trade
costs, τi, for instance, raises the ex-post export profits. This will lead to increased
firm entry and, hence, more competition within the industry (due to a larger mass
of active firms and higher prices for the factor used abundantly) driving least ef-
ficient domestic firms’ ex-post profits down, forcing some of them to exit. This
leads to a rise in average aggregate productivity (at industry-levels) and zero-profit
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productivity cut-off, ϕ∗i , below which companies drop out of the industry. Higher
export profits at exporters also reduce the exporting productivity threshold, ϕ∗ix.
Importantly for our analysis, the magnitude of these changes differs across sec-
tors. A fall in trade costs will imply a larger increase in labor demand in the com-
parative advantage industry than in the comparative disadvantage industry, putting
upward pressure on the relative price of the abundant factor. Therefore, the zero-
profit productivity cut-off increases by more in the comparative advantage industry
and lies closer to the export productivity threshold than in the comparative disad-
vantage sector.
In sum, this framework not only generates intra- as well as inter-industry trade
flows, it also predicts trade liberalization to produce simultaneous job creation and
job destruction in all industries, where gross and net job reallocations vary with
country and industry characteristics.
1.2.2 Job reallocation within and between industries
The BRS model features between-firm job flows even at steady state through the
exogenous firm death rate δ. Our main interest, however, is on job reallocations in-
duced by changes in trade openness, i.e. on transitional dynamics between steady
states. Specifically, we study between-industry, within-industry and total job real-
locations as trade becomes freer. For each factor-industry pair, we can decompose
the change in employment following a fall in variable trade costs into five parts:
(1) the change in employment by firms that enter but do not take up production,
(2) the change in employment by non-exporters that exit the industry after trade
liberalization,
(3) the change in employment by non-exporters that survive trade liberalization
and remain non-exporters,
(4) the change in employment by non-exporters that turn into exporters after
trade liberalization,
(5) the change in employment by surviving exporters.
With those five components in hand, we compute total (TTit), between-industry
(BTit) and within-industry (WTit) job reallocations for each industry i and time
period t as follows:
TTit = |(1)it|+ |(2)it|+ |(3)it|+ |(4)it|+ |(5)it| ,
BTit = (1)it + (2)it + (3)it + (4)it + (5)it,
WTit = TTit − |BTit| .
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These variables allow us to compute the share of between-industry job reallo-
cation in total job reallocation, BSit, our proxy for labor-market adjustment costs.
That is:
BSit =
|BTit|
WTit + |BTit| =
|BTit|
TTit
∈ (0, 1). (1.1)
When BSit → 0, the cost associated with workers changing firms can be as-
sumed to be low, since most between-firm moves occur within a given industry.
Alternatively, when BSit → 1, the cost associated with job reallocations will be
high, because most displaced workers have to change not only their employer firm
but also their industry. We thus rely on the theoretically well grounded and empir-
ically supported assumption that job moves between industries are more costly on
average than moves within an industry.4
The construction of BSit is best explained graphically, by illustrating a typical
simulated transition scenario in the BRS model. Figure 1.1 shows employment
densities with high trade costs (τHF = τFH = 2) and for low trade costs (τHF =
τFH = 1.4) in the comparative advantage industry at the benchmark equilibrium.5
Figure 1.1: Simulated employment effects of trade liberalization in the comparative
advantage industry
Notes: Employment distributions for the comparative advantage industry: low trade costs versus
high trade costs.
Source: Own simulations based on the model of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007).
4See e.g. Neal (1995), Couch and Placzek (2010), and, for a comprehensive survey, Carrington
and Fallick (2015).
5The parameter vector used to simulate the benchmark equilibrium is given in Appendix Table
A.1. In Appendix Figure A.1, we trace the corresponding employment distributions for the compar-
ative disadvantage industry.
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The five components of employment adjustment distinguished above can be
identified in these graphs. It is easy to see that this model implies within-industry as
well as between-industry job reallocations. In both industries, jobs are lost in firms
that exit because greater trade exposure raises the zero-profit productivity thresh-
old (area (2)) and compresses sales of surviving non-exporting firms (area (3)), but
at the same time jobs are gained in firms that switch from being non-exporters to
being exporters (area (4)). In other words, jobs are reallocated within industries
from low-productivity domestically-oriented firms to higher-productivity export-
oriented firms. The other two adjustment components are positive for the compar-
ative advantage industry and negative for the comparative disadvantage industry,
thus representing between-industry employment reallocation: after trade liberal-
ization, the comparative advantage industry attracts more entry (area (1)), and its
continuing exporters increase their sales and thus employment (area (5)).
1.2.3 Trade shocks, IIT and job reallocation
In the simulations shown above, we model trade shocks as symmetric falls in
iceberg-type variable trade costs, to represent bilateral trade liberalization. How-
ever, other trade shocks can be considered. For instance the variable cost of ex-
porting (denoted τHF from Home’s perspective) could change differently from the
variable cost of importing (τFH ), akin to currency appreciation or depreciation. Al-
ternatively, variable trade costs could remain unchanged but fixed exporting costs
(fix) could change; or features of the foreign economy could evolve at unchanged
trade costs.
We now explore the relationship between IIT and the share of between-industry
job reallocation for different trade-shock scenarios. Our measure of job realloca-
tion, BSit, is as defined in (1.1). As the relevant measure of IIT, we use the index
of “marginal IIT”:
MIITit = 1− |∆Xit −∆Mit||∆Xit|+ |∆Mit| ,
where ∆ stands for the difference between year t and t − 1. This index takes
values between zero and one, and it is increasing in the degree of overlap between
simultaneous changes in imports and exports.
Given its frequent use in applied studies, and despite the shortcomings of
that measure in capturing adjustments pattern (Bru¨lhart, 1994), we also consider
changes in the Grubel and Lloyd (1975) index of IIT:
∆GLit = GLit −GLi,t−1, where GLit = 1− |Xit −Mit|
(Xit +Mit)
.
We illustrate the relationship between IIT and job reallocation in scatter plots
tracing IIT and job reallocation across a range of parameter values. In a first step,
we can extend the exercise of Figure 1.1, where we trace employment distributions
for one particular change in trade costs, to consider a large number of such changes.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the evolution of equilibrium IIT measures and BSit as the
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variable trade cost τHF = τFH is lowered in percentage-point steps from 1.6 to
1.0. The graph illustrates that the IIT measures and the share of between-industry
job flows co-move with opposite signs for most of the interval, consistent with
the SAH. However, the minimum value of ∆GL lies noticeably to the right of the
maximum value of BSit, showing that there is an interval of trade costs within
which stronger rises in the GL index are associated with greater shares of between-
industry job flows - in contradiction with the SAH.
Figure 1.2: IIT, job flows and trade costs
Notes: Comparative advantage industry; baseline parameter values; smoothed equilibrium series in
1 percentage-point steps.
Source: Own simulations based on the model of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007).
Next, we repeat the exercise that underlies Figure 1.2 but we plot MIIT against
BSit. In the two left-hand-side panels of Figure 1.3, we simulate a symmetric and
linear reduction in variable trade costs from a 100 percent ad valorem equivalent
(τHF = τFH = 2) to zero (τHF = τFH = 1). The relationship between the two
IIT measures andBSit is monotonically negative, consistent with the SAH. On the
right-hand-side of Figure 1.3, we simulate the reverse scenario, i.e. a move from
free trade to very costly trade. In this case, the negative relationship between MIIT
and BSit is unchanged, whereas for ∆GL it turns positive, thus illustrating the
unstable relationship between the latter measure and the pattern of labor-market
adjustment.
Changes in trade costs can be unilateral, e.g. through exchange-rate fluctua-
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Figure 1.3: IIT and job reallocation when trade costs change symmetrically
Source: Own simulations based on the model of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007).
tions. We simulate such asymmetric trade shocks in Figure 1.4, where we let τHF
change in constant steps from 2 to 1 (left-hand panels) and from 1 to 2 (right-hand
panels) while τFH remains at 1.6. This could be thought of as representing a deval-
uation or revaluation of Home’s currency, respectively. The same qualitative result
is found here as for symmetric changes in trade costs: MIIT and BSit covary in
opposite directions, as posited by the SAH. For ∆GL, however, the sign of the
correlation depends on the sign of the change in trade costs.6
We consider as a “trade shock” also a change in exogenous parameters affecting
Home’s trade partner while trade costs remain constant. Three representative cases
are illustrated in Figure 1.5: we track trade and labor-market changes following
an increase in the size of Foreign NF (from 1,300 to 3,700, left-hand panels),
following an increase in the homogeneity of firm productivity draws in Foreign aF
(from 3.4 to 4.4), and following a decrease in minimum ex ante firm productivity
kF (from 0.9 to 0.2). In all three cases we again detect clear negative correlations
between MIIT and BSit but no systematic relationship between ∆GL and BSit.7
6Qualitatively equivalent patterns are found for symmetric and asymmetric variations in fixed
exporting costs.
7We have also simulated changes in factor intensities affecting only Foreign and found analogous
results.
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Figure 1.4: IIT and job reallocation when trade costs change asymmetrically
Source: Own simulations based on the model of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007).
Figures 1.3 to 1.5 are indicative of a robust negative relationship between MIIT
and BSit irrespective of the trade shock considered, as posited by the SAH. How-
ever, these simulations show that there are exceptions. The top-left panel of Fig-
ure 1.3, for instance, shows a small segment over which the relationship between
MIIT and BSit is positive. It is therefore possible in the BRS framework that the
SAH does not hold. To determine the likelihood of this possibility, we have run
comprehensive simulations across the full range of parameter combinations that
are compatible with equilibrium. Specifically, we track symmetric decreases in
the variable trade cost, letting τ go from 1.6 to 1 in steps of 0.01. We conduct
this exercise for 1,192 combinations of the nine other exogenous parameters in the
model (see Table A.1 for details). Given that we have two industries, this leaves us
with 2,384 equilibrium paths analogous to those illustrated in Figures 1.3 to 1.5.
Across these simulations, we find that all correlations between MIIT and BSit are
negative, with an average value of -0.97. Some three percent of correlations with
∆GL, however, are positive, for an average value of -0.77. When we do the re-
verse exercise, letting trade costs rise from free trade to 60 percent ad valorem, the
same correlations are found between MIIT and BSit, whereas the sign of the cor-
relations with ∆GL in fact turns out to be positive on average. These simulations
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strongly suggest that the relationship between MIIT and the share of inter-industry
job reallocation, while not universally negative, is predominantly negative. No
such generalization is possible with respect to ∆GL.
Figure 1.5: IIT and job reallocation when the foreign economy changes
Source: Own simulations based on the model of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007).
1.2.4 Trade and technology shocks combined
In the real economy, exogenous trade shocks likely coincide with endogenous
changes in domestic production and consumption that in turn affect trade patterns
and job reallocations. This could affect the observed link between IIT and labor-
market adjustment. For that reason, we run some additional simulations in which
we model simultaneous shocks to trade costs and to parameters of the Home pro-
duction function.
Two representative scenarios are illustrated in Figure 1.6. In the left-hand-side
panel, we lower τHF in constant steps from 2 to 1 (as in Figure 1.4), and we si-
multaneously increase Home’s minimum ex ante firm productivity (kH ) from 0.2
to 1.2. In the right-hand-side panel, we again gradually lower τHF , and we si-
multaneously reduce βH1 , the share Home’s abundant factor in its production func-
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tion (from 0.96 to 0.51, while βH2 increases from 0.04 to 0.49). In both cases it
becomes clearly apparent that these combinations of domestic and trade-related
changes blur the relationship between MIIT and BSit, making it highly nonlinear
and non-monotonic. These graphs are indicative of a general pattern we find in our
wide-ranging simulations: as soon as we consider trade shocks jointly with domes-
tic technology shocks, the strong relationship between MIIT and BSit found when
considering trade shocks alone disappears.
This result is of course not surprising: while the causal effect of MIIT (as a
manifestation of an exogenous trade shock) on labor reallocation is overwhelm-
ingly negative as stated by the SAH, simultaneously allowing for other forces to
affect labor reallocation and trade flows will weaken the empirical correlation. To
uncover the causal effect of MIIT on labor reallocation, MIIT therefore ought to be
instrumented with variables representing exogenous trade shocks. This is what we
endeavor to achieve in our empirical section.
Figure 1.6: IIT and job reallocation when trade costs and domestic technology
change
Source: Own simulations based on the model of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007).
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1.3 Empirical test
1.3.1 Estimation
We now seek to explore the relationship between IIT and job reallocation empiri-
cally. Our best hope of finding such effects is by looking at a highly trade-oriented
economy. By working with data for Switzerland, whose trade-to-GDP ratio aver-
aged 84.3% over our sample period 1991-2008, we have what should be a propi-
tious setting.
Like many prior studies, we regress our measure of inter-industry job realloca-
tion, BSit, on an appropriate measure of IIT, the interaction of IIT with sectoral
trade openness, and a number of controls. Given that the theory implies no specific
functional forms, and our simulations suggest linear approximations to work well,
we focus on linear additive regression models.
Specifically, we consider the following baseline panel model:
BSit = β0 + β1IITit + β2IITit × |∆STO|it + β3 |∆STO|it
+ Ψ´itλit + ηi + νt + εit (1.2)
where
Ψ´it = [|∆AD|it FIRMit−1 EMPLOYit−1] .
IITit is defined as the Bru¨lhart (1994) MIIT index, but we shall also explore
the implications of using ∆GL instead. |∆STO|it is the absolute change in sec-
toral trade openness between t− 1 and t, where STOit = Xit+MitGV Ait , and GV Ait is
gross value added. For the main effect of IIT, β1, to be interpretable as the effect
of IIT on an industry with average trade openness, |∆STO|it is centered around
its industry mean. In order to control for domestic inter-industry demand shocks,
we include the variable |∆AD|it, the absolute change in sectoral apparent demand
between t − 1 and t, where ADit = GV Ait + Xit − Mit (in CHF bn at con-
stant prices). FIRMi,t−1 and EMPLOYi,t−1 denote the number of firms and
workers respectively (in thousands). Finally, ηi and νt are industry and year fixed
effects, respectively, purging our regressions from the effects of all time-invariant
and industry-invariant unobservables. As an alternative to including industry fixed
effects, we systematically also estimate the model in first differences.
One issue that has not been addressed in the existing empirical literature is the
potential endogeneity of IIT. As our simulations show, unobserved shocks affecting
both IIT and job reallocations might confound the causal effect of IIT.
We therefore propose to instrument for IIT in the following way. Building on
Goldberg (2004), we construct industry-level trade-weighted real exchange rates
for Switzerland:
trerit =
∑
c
ωict−1 × rerct ,
where
ωict−1 =
M ict−1 +Xict−1∑
c(M
ic
t−1 + +Xict−1)
,
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and rerct is the Swiss-franc real exchange rate with respect to the currency of coun-
try c in year t.8 As an instrument for IIT, we take the absolute change in trerit,∣∣∆trerit∣∣. This variable is expected to be inversely related to IIT, as exchange-rate-
induced idiosyncratic changes in industry-level price competitiveness are likely as-
sociated with inter-industry adjustments in sales and thus employment. Since the
effects on domestic employment of exchange rate fluctuations will be fully medi-
ated by changes in trade flows and apparent demand, the exclusion restriction plau-
sibly holds. Moreover, since
∣∣∆trerit∣∣ depends on lagged country-level changes in
exchange rates and trade shares, we can safely rule out reverse causation from the
industry-level variable IIT.
1.3.2 Data
We construct our dependent variable BSit using individual-level data from the
Swiss Labor Force Survey, available annually from 1991 to 2008. This is a rotat-
ing panel with participants interviewed in five consecutive years, allowing us to
observe between-industry and within-industry inter-firm moves which, in turn, are
used to construct the labor adjustment cost variable according to definition (1.1).
The finest level of sectoral disaggregation we can attain consistently over the
sample period in the Labor Force Survey data is the NACE Rev. 1.0 four-digit
level. We concord those data from NACE Rev. 1.0 to ISIC Rev. 3 in order to
merge them with the trade data. Bilateral trade data are taken from the UN COM-
TRADE database at the 5-digit SITC level, which we concord to corresponding
ISIC sectors.9 After concording, we are left with 108 manufacturing industries. As
a robustness check, we also estimate our models at the three-digit level of the ISIC
classification, featuring 54 manufacturing industries. We have 29,940 individual
observations in manufacturing firms and for which we can identify whether or not
a move has taken place, yielding 17 individual-level observations per four-digit
industry and year.
To compute changes in sectoral trade openness (|∆STO|it) and apparent de-
mand (|∆AD|it), we use sectoral gross value added data from the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office. Because these data are available at the NACE two-digit level
only, we use disaggregate census-based total employment to apportion value added
to four-digit industries. Firm numbers (FIRMi,t−1) are also available from the
Federal Statistical Office’s multi-annual census.10
Bilateral nominal exchange rates, needed to construct industry-specific ex-
change rates as an instrument for IIT (
∣∣∆trerit∣∣), were extracted from the website
oanda.com. Summary statistics for all variables are reported in Table 1.1.
8We consider Switzerland’s 30 largest trade partners: Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg,
Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, USA and UK.
9Trade flows are measured in constant CHF (base year 2005), using the Swiss CPI deflator.
10In our sample period, a firm census was conducted in 1995, 2001, 2005 and 2008. We complete
the missing years through linear interpolation.
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1.3.3 Results
Our baseline fixed-effects and first-difference IV estimation results are shown in
Table 1.2. They support the empirical relevance of the SAH. The effect of MIIT
on between-industry labor reallocation is consistently and statistically significantly
negative. This effect is more pronounced in sector-years subject to stronger trade
shocks as measured by |∆STO|it. The coefficients are remarkably stable across
the eight specifications. The estimated coefficient on MIIT is around -0.55. This
suggests that compared to a pure inter-industry trade shock (MIIT=0), a pure intra-
industry trade shock (MIIT=1) will reduce the share of between-industry job flows
by fully 55 percentage points. Or, put differently, a one-standard-deviation in-
crease in MIIT will lower the share of between-industry job flows by 0.83 standard
deviations.11
Our instruments perform well overall. First-stage F statistics according to An-
grist and Pischke (2009), while on the low side for the fixed-effects model, are sat-
isfactory in the first-differenced specification. Stock-Wright LM statistics for the
significance of the endogenous regressors are satisfactory throughout, suggesting
that MIIT is indeed a relevant structural variable. Perhaps most reassuringly, the
first-stage regressions confirm that our instrument behaves in the expected way:
exchange-rate variability is consistently negatively related to MIIT, and in most
cases statistically significantly so (see Appendix Table A.3). The estimated coeffi-
cients on our measure of domestic demand shocks, |∆AD|it, are negative through-
out, in line with our prior.
In Table 1.3, we show a range of alternatives to our baseline specification. In
the first two columns, we report the main fixed-effects and first-difference estimates
from Table 1.2, for comparison.
One potential issue are different sample sizes for our dependent variable across
industries: BSit is computed over small numbers of observations for some sectors.
We have therefore explored a range of different weighting schemes.12 It turns
out that our results are robust to re-weighting. As a representative example, we
show results based on weighting industries by their total trade in columns (3) and
(4) of Table 1.3. These estimates are larger in absolute terms and more precisely
measured than our baseline results, which is not surprising given the fact that the
variance of the disturbance term is likely to be smaller in larger (and thus better
measured) industries.
Next, we explore the sensitivity of our baseline results to changing industry
definitions. In columns (5) and (6) of Table 1.3, we report estimates based on our
baseline regression specifications applied to three-digit industries. These estimates
are somewhat noisier than the four-digit results, but the coefficients all have the
same signs and similar magnitudes.
11See Table 1.1 for the standard deviations needed to make these calculations.
12We have weighted industries by the number of years for which the dependent variable is ob-
served; by their time-averaged shares in total employment and firm numbers; and by their time-
averaged shares in total imports, exports and total trade. Detailed results are available on request.
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Table 1.2: Adjustment costs and MIIT (IV estimates, 2nd stage)
Fixed-effects models First-difference models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MIIT -0.650 -0.563* -0.563* -0.521* -0.663** -0.583** -0.550* -0.465*
(0.414) (0.341) (0.340) (0.299) (0.331) (0.264) (0.326) (0.267)
MIIT × |∆STO| -0.175 -0.171 -0.256*** -0.277**
(0.193) (0.184) (0.095) (0.109)
|∆STO| 0.032 0.105 0.109 0.055** 0.157*** 0.179**
(0.019) (0.091) (0.092) (0.028) (0.057) (0.070)
|∆AD| -0.136 -0.144 -0.175* -0.145
(0.105) (0.108) (0.095) (0.100)
Firms 0.003 0.006 -0.151 0.045
(0.210) (0.206) (0.434) (0.423)
Employment -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.010
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
N 994 994 994 994 693 693 693 693
No. industries 100 100 100 100 84 84 84 84
First-Stage Statistics
K-P LM test (p.val.) 0.091 0.055 0.082 0.052 0.051 0.033 0.049 0.029
SW LM S test (p.val.) 0.046 0.046 0.138 0.135 0.059 0.049 0.075 0.074
AP F test MIIT 2.989 3.810 3.894 4.660 6.895 8.946 6.987 10.878
AP F test interaction 1.945 1.992 18.884 18.854
Notes: The dependent variable is BSit, the share of between-industry job reallocation in total job reallocation.
All regressions include year fixed effects and a constant term (not reported). Robust standard errors reported
in parentheses are clustered at the four-digit industry level. Firms and Employment are lagged one year in all
regressions. K-P LM test is the Kleibergen-Paap underidentification LM test. SW LM S test is the Stock-Wright
LM S statistic for weak-instrument robust inference. AP F test is the Angrist-Pischke first-stage F statistic for
weak identification of individual endogenous regressors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Source: Own estimations based on merged COMTRADE-SLFS database.
In columns (9) to (12) of Table 1.3, we provide estimates corresponding to
our baseline specifications but without instrumenting the MIIT variable. These re-
sults turn out to be qualitatively equivalent to our IV estimates, but the estimated
magnitudes are considerably smaller. This is consistent with our theoretical simu-
lations that suggest confounding domestic effects to potentially bias the observed
relationship between MIIT and labor-market adjustment towards zero.
In columns (13) and (14), we present estimates with an alternative dependent
variable. Instead of the share of between-industry job reallocation in total job real-
location, BSit as defined in (1.1), we use the share of between-industry job reallo-
cation in total job (thus including movers and stayers), ABSit. That is:
ABSit =
|BTit|
WTit + |BTit|+ STAYit =
|BTit|
TTit + STAYit
∈ (0, 1).13 (1.3)
13See Appendix Table A.2 for descriptive statistics of estimation samples when using ABSit.
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While the effect of MIIT not surprisingly appears less distinctly with this al-
ternative dependent variable that incorporates the large number of stayers, it is still
apparent even in this specification.
Finally, we return to the baseline regression specification but replace the MIIT
index by the change in the GL index, ∆GLit. These estimates are shown in
columns (7) and (8) of Table 1.3. The estimated coefficients are statistically in-
significant and do not have stable sign. These results confirm that Grubel-Lloyd
based measures are not helpful for inferring the adjustment implications of trade
expansion.
One issue left unexplored in Table 1.3 is timing. Our baseline estimates are
predicated on one-year intervals are the relevant time horizon over which to mea-
sure trade and labor-market adjustments, but theory is silent as to the appropriate
timing. We have therefore experimented widely with different interval lengths and
lag structures and found the strong and robust effects observed for year-on-year
changes to weaken considerably with any departure from that dynamic structure.
As an example, we present results computed over two-year intervals in Appendix
Table A.4. No statistically significant findings emerge at two-year horizons, even
though the IV estimates retain their signs and approximate magnitudes. Our esti-
mates therefore confirm previous research suggesting that the link between MIIT
and labor-market adjustment primarily applies to annual frequencies.
1.4 Conclusion
We have studied the relation between intra-industry trade (IIT) and associated
worker flows, taking the latter as an indicator of labor-market adjustment costs,
proposing two main innovations. First, we have generated dynamic IIT (MIIT) in
a general-equilibrium trade model featuring heterogeneous firms, and related these
trade patterns to intra- and inter-industry job reallocations. Second, we have tested
the relationship between IIT and worker flows in panel data for Switzerland, using
an instrumental-variable strategy to account for the potential endogeneity of MIIT.
Our instruments are based on industry-specific real exchange rate indices. Both
the theoretical and empirical analyses are consistent with the “smooth adjustment
hypothesis”, according to which IIT expansion is less disruptive than inter-industry
trade expansion. Although there are specific theoretical cases in which higher MIIT
is associated with a higher share of between-industry job flows, our simulations
suggest an overwhelming dominance of the reverse relationship. In our empirical
estimations, a pure intra-industry trade shock is found to generate less than half as
much between-industry worker reallocation than a pure inter-industry trade shock.
Our analysis confirms that in the context of adjustment, measures of MIIT are more
informative than Grubel-Lloyd indices.
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Chapter 2
Net Imports, Gross Imports and
Individual Workers: Evidence
from the United Kingdom
MARIUS BRU¨LHART, ARNAUD JOYE AND JOANNE LINDLEY
We explore the worker-level impact of increased import penetra-
tion in UK manufacturing industries over the period 1997-2011. Our
approach borrows the identification strategy of a corresponding anal-
ysis for the US by Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014), which we
extend in five directions: (i) our data permits us to decompose total
earnings into hours of work and hourly pay; (ii) we look at net as well
as gross imports, thus separately examining the effects of increased
intra-industry trade; (iii) we focus on import penetration from EU
countries in addition to China; (iv) we estimate worker-level outcomes
separately by occupations; and (v) we look at the indirect impact of
import competition on worker-level outcomes along the value chain.
We find that gross and net import penetration from China had signifi-
cantly negative effects on workers’ earnings, wages and hours of work
in the affected industries. In contrast, increased gross imports from
the EU are associated with positive worker-level outcomes. We also
find that the adverse worker-level effects of increased imports from
China are most pronounced among managers and skilled trades and
least pronounced among professionals, clerical staff and plant opera-
tors. Finally, we find that increased imports from China in an industry
located further down the value chain (i.e. a downstream industry) have
adverse worker-level effects in the sourcing (i.e. a upstream) industry.
JEL Classification: F16, J23, J31, J62
Keywords: gross imports, net imports, labor demand, wages, earnings
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2.1 Introduction
Traditionally, the empirical evidence for detrimental wage effects from interna-
tional trade has been sparse, with only a modest increase in the skilled-unskilled
wage gap being found as a consequence of foreign outsourcing (Feenstra and Han-
son, 1999). Skill biased technical change, on the other hand, has been shown to
have a bigger impact on the US wage and earnings inequalities (Katz and Autor,
1999). So even though trade theory identifies that free trade with countries at any
income level may affect individual worker outcomes such as domestic wages, earn-
ings and employment evidence suggests that imports from developing economies
were generally too small to have any major impact on US employment or wage
inequality, especially during the period of rapid inequality growth that occurred
during the 1980s and 1990s (Krugman, 2000).
More recently however, the growing importance of low-wage countries in the
global economy has put new pressure on high-wage countries (e.g. Freeman, 1995;
Feenstra, 2010), and this has provided a unique opportunity to examine the impact
of international trade on worker adjustment. Most of the recent growth in global
manufacturing output has come from China, as a consequence of its transition to
a market-oriented economy. Indeed, Hanson (2012) reports that since 1990 China
has accounted for more than 75% of the growth in manufacturing value added
engendered by low- and middle-income economies. Moreover, China has dra-
matically improved its share of world manufacturing exports which has rapidly
increased from around 2% in 1990 to 16% in 2011 (Autor et al., 2014).
Until now, most of the recent research looking for detrimental employment and
earnings effects in developed countries that might have occurred from increased
imports from China has been undertaken for the US. This is mainly as a conse-
quence of its trade imbalances with developing countries, like China, and the rise
in the share of total US spending on low-income countries’ goods (see for example
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013a).1 However,
the spectacular Chinese export boom is expected to hit workers in the United King-
dom (henceforth UK) in a somewhat similarly disruptive way.
Of course the UK already has close trade ties with the European Union (hence-
forth the EU) which might also be expected to have had a sizable impact on its
labor market. Trade theory predicts that trade with countries at any income level
my affect domestic workers, yet the impact will depend on where imports origi-
nate (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006). Consequently, it is important to make
the distinction between gross and net imports (or whether bilateral trade patterns
are mainly in the form of inter- or intra-industry trade) in order to fully under-
stand trade competition and its impact on medium- to long-run workers’ career
paths. The recent availability of new micro-level data, especially administrative
data, enables researchers to better investigate the causal effect of enhanced trade
1According to Autor et al. (2014), the share of US total spending on Chinese goods rose from
0.6% in 1991 to 4.6% in 2007.
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competition on labor market outcomes at the individual level.
In this paper, we analyze the effect of exposure to increasing trade integration
on UK manufacturing workers’ wages, employment and earnings. We focus on
trade integration, mainly in the form of increased import competition from China
(i.e. low-income countries) but also from (more similar countries like) the EU. We
use the econometric approach of Autor et al. (2014) by using, as a measure of trade
exposure, the growth in UK imports from China, or the EU, over the period 1997
to 2011 that took place in a worker’s initial industry. Using individual-worker level
panel data from the UK New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD) we can an-
alyze the medium- to long-run consequences of exposure to import competition on
earnings, employment spells, hourly pay and hours worked of UK manufacturing
workers.
We add five dimensions to the approach of Autor et al. (2014). First, our data
permit us to decompose total earnings into hours of work and hourly pay, hence
allowing us to assess the relative contributions of each part in the adjustment pro-
cess to trade shocks. Second, we look at net as well as gross import competition,
thus separately examining the effects of increased intra-industry trade. Third, we
contrast the impact of imports coming from China to those coming from the EU.
We would expect a different impact on worker outcomes whether import competi-
tion stem from China or the EU. Fourth, unlike Autor et al. (2014) we are able to
control for the worker’s occupation and evaluate import competition effects within
occupation groups. One would expect workers employed in low-skill intensive
occupations to exhibit declining earnings profiles as a consequence of trade com-
pared to other workers within the same occupation; and not just workers relative
to all workers across all occupations, which could be a consequence of skill biased
technical change instead of pure trade effects. Indeed, within occupation groups,
workers employed in industries that face higher subsequent exposure to import
competition, say from China, would be expected to exhibit a worse earnings tra-
jectory.2 Finally, we also look at the indirect impact of import competition on
worker-level outcomes along the value chain.3 We are interested in capturing the
effects of import competition, not only on workers within the affected industries,
but also on workers in neighbouring downstream or upstream industries; effects
that could be transmitted through the demand for or supply of intermediate inputs.
Regarding UK trade exposure with China, we find that, on average, workers
more exposed to import competition see a fall in cumulative earnings, a drop in
cumulative wages and cumulative hours of work over the sample period from 1997
to 2011. The implied differential decrease in earnings over the 15-year sample
period, between workers at the 75th percentile of industry trade exposure relative
2Unfortunately, we do not observe individual education attainment in the NESPD, so we can-
not directly capture skills of workers at the initial period. However, as it will be clear, we control
for occupation at the 2-digit level and for a bunch of (pre-shock) individual observable character-
istics. Thus, even though we cannot observe worker skills, we argue that we do control (somehow
indirectly) for skill/ability in the best way we can.
3We are greatly indebted to Olivier Cadot for suggesting this idea.
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to workers at the 25th percentile is 48% of initial annual earnings. The drop in
wages is equal to 69.2% of initial total wages and the drop in hours worked is
equal to 33.6% of total hours worked in the initial year. When considering changes
in net imports, rather than changes in gross imports to account for the potential
new export opportunities that China’s economic opening might offer, the results
imply a bigger negative impact on earnings, wages and employment relative to
gross imports. This suggests that what really hurts UK manufacturing workers is
the difference in nature of imports and exports.
The trade competition impact differs across occupation groups, which high-
lights great heterogeneity in trade adjustment by job characteristics. Occupations
such as managers, skilled trade and elementary production are most adversely af-
fected by the rise in Chinese imports. Somewhat unexpected, we find that the
adverse effects of increased imports from China are most pronounced among man-
agers and among production workers performing less routine tasks. Managers
are the only occupation group that sees a drop in both margins of employment,
whereas clerks and secretaries suffer in terms of hours worked and skilled trades
and plant/machine operators’ wages are negatively affected by the rise in Chinese
import competition.
Not only are workers affected by increased exposure to Chinese imports within
their own industry, they are also sensible to a rise in exposure to China’s trade in the
industry that purchases the highest value of intermediate inputs from theirs. From
the perspective of a worker employed in a given industry, higher trade competition
in an industry located further down the value chain has a significant and negative
impact on her wages and employment. Indeed, higher downstream exposure to
import competition results in an additional implied 75th-25th percentile drop of
46.9% of initial total wages and a drop of 24.8% of initial total hours worked for a
worker employed in the sourcing industry.
Unlike China, increased imports from the EU are associated with positive earn-
ings, wages and employment, a finding that is largely explained by the fact that
increased imports from the EU were mostly offset by increased same-industry ex-
ports to the EU, and that the former might not substitute to UK domestic produc-
tion, but rather complement them.
We begin in Section 3.5 by documenting some facts about UK bilateral trade
patterns with China and with the EU. Section 2.3 then provides an overview of
recent work, along with previous studies, analyzing trade shocks on labor markets.
Section 2.4 describes our empirical methodology to estimating the impact of ex-
posure to trade competition, and documents facts about UK industry exposure to
imports from China and the EU. The data used and the main estimating equation
are discussed in Section 2.5, while Section 2.6 and Section 2.7 present the core re-
sults for the labor market effects of increased exposure to import competition from
China and the EU respectively. Section 3.7 concludes.
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2.2 UK bilateral trade patterns
We begin in this section by providing descriptive evidence showing why China,
among emerging economies, is UK’s most interesting (and potentially disruptive)
trading partner. We then document UK bilateral trade patterns with China and
contrast them with those associated with the EU.
Figure 2.1, which shows UK import values from the 5 BRICS countries taken
individually, carries two main facts. First, as evident in the figure, the growth rate
of imports from China exhibits, by far, the biggest increase over time. Second,
imports from China took off abruptly around 2001, when China joined the WTO,
largely surpassing UK import values from other BRICS countries.
Figure 2.1: UK import values from individual BRICS countries, 1988-2012
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for total manufacturing industries.
Adding to the picture, we can see in Figure 2.2, which replicates Figure 2.1
but plotting export values instead of imports, that China has become (since 2004)
the most important export destination for the UK among BRICS economies; even
surpassing India. These two pictures highlight the growing importance of China as
a major trading partner for the UK, both in terms of imports and exports.
Isolating UK trade patterns with China, Figure 2.3, which plot values of im-
ports from and exports to China, illustrates the strong asymmetric evolution of
both trade flows. The growth rate of UK imports from China is far bigger than the
corresponding growth rate for exports signifying that Chinese imports may put a
bigger pressure on UK workers than the potential beneficial effects of export op-
portunities in China. Moreover, the fact that imports took off around 2001, when
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Figure 2.2: UK export values from individual BRICS countries, 1988-2012
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for total manufacturing industries.
China joined the WTO, suggests (along with the first fact) that the Chinese export
boom may be mainly driven by a combination of its internal-fostered transition to a
market-oriented economy and of trade tariff reductions following WTO accession
(something we cannot distinguish from this figure).
From the perspective of the UK, the rise of China in the world economy is
expected to have similar qualitative impact on its domestic workers than in the US.
Indeed, bilateral trade relationships with China appear to be qualitatively similar
in both countries. (Figures B.2 in the Appendix, which displays similar trends
for both trade flow types for the US.). Note the magnitude differences between
the UK and the US of both trade flow types roughly correspond to the US/UK
population ratio (around 5).4 Thus, as in the US, we can think of UK industries
having been confronted to a major rise in import competition from China without
a counterbalancing rise in demand for UK exports.5
Concerning the UK trade relationship with the EU, we can see in Figure 2.4
4When looking in proportion rather than in volumes, we reach the same observations; the growth
rate of the share of UK imports from China, relative to UK total imports, increases much more rapidly
than the corresponding one for export share, with an inflexion point around 2001 (see Figure B.1 in
the Appendix), and that is qualitatively similar for the US (see Figure B.3).
5Adding to the picture, we can observe the same declining path in the share of UK working age
population employed in manufacturing industries as in the US, which negative trend accelerated in
the late-1990s and continued through the 2000s. Indeed, Figure B.11 in the Appendix shows that the
share of UK employment in manufacturing has fallen from 19% in 1994 to 10% in 2011.
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Figure 2.3: Trade between the UK and China, 1988-2012
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries.
that imports from and exports to the EU have increased over time with much sim-
ilar growth rates than the corresponding ones with China.6 We can see that trade
with the EU happens to be more balanced and of a different nature than with China,
which will matter for its impact on the labor market (more on this in Section 2.7).7
This is where the distinction between gross and net imports (or whether bilateral
trade patterns are mainly in the form of inter- or intra-industry trade) becomes
crucial in understanding the trade competition impact on workers’ career paths.
Indeed, we can reasonably think that imports from the EU might not be as detri-
mental to workers as imports originating from China, because of potential comple-
mentaries between imports coming from the EU and the UK domestic production
structure.
6Our definition of the European Union comprises the first 15 countries that entered the union
before 2004 less the UK. The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
7As with China, UK bilateral trade patterns, in volumes, with the EU are qualitatively similar
than those of the US with the EU (Figure B.5 in the Appendix). Moreover, UK (and US) exports and
imports shares with the EU are closely match as well but slightly declining over time (see Figure B.4
for the UK and Figure B.6 for the US in the Appendix). Note that the proportion of imports coming
from the EU and exports going to the EU is 2 to 3 times bigger for the UK than for the US highlighting
the relative importance of the EU as a key trading partner for the UK.
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Figure 2.4: Trade between the UK and the EU, 1988-2012
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries. UK
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2.3 Literature background
Mainly because of its trade imbalances with developing countries and the rise in
the share of total US spending on low-income countries’ goods, the focus has been
primarily set on the US and on the adverse effect of increased import competition
from low-income countries on workers’ employment and earnings. Low-income
countries export growth in 1990 onwards is mainly due to China’s transition to a
market-oriented economy. The main events that made China more open include
a massive rural-to-urban migration of more than 150 million workers (see Chen,
Jin, and Yue, 2010); the access of domestic industries to previously banned foreign
technologies, capital goods and intermediate inputs (see Hsieh and Klenow, 2009);
the permission for multinational firms to operate in China (see Naughton, 2007,
which is a great source of information about China and its transition to a market-
oriented economy); and its accession the WTO in 2001.8
This has led to a number of papers investigating the impact of increased im-
ports from China on labor markets. As already discussed, Autor et al. (2014) is
the most similar to ours since they use individual worker data to look at the impact
of increased exposure to import competition from China on cumulative earnings
8For additional sources on China and its transition to a market-oriented economy, see for example
Hanson (2012), Feenstra and Wei (2010), Harrison, McLaren, and McMillan (2010), Hsieh and Ossa
(2011), and Brandt, Van Biesbroeck, and Zhang (2012).
2.3. LITERATURE BACKGROUND 29
and employment of US workers over the period 1992-2007. They use individual-
level administrative data in manufacturing industries. Their findings suggest that
workers who initially were employed in manufacturing industries which experi-
enced high subsequent import growth from China cumulate lower earnings; are at
bigger risk of exiting the labor force and obtaining public disability benefits; spend
less time employed for their initial employers; spend less time in their initial in-
dustry; and spend more time employed elsewhere in manufacturing and outside
manufacturing. Moreover, earnings losses are greater for workers with low initial
wages; low initial tenure; low attachment to the labor force; and for those em-
ployed at larger firms with lower than industry-average wage levels. Trade com-
petition in terms of exposure to import competition also induces substantial job
churning among high-wage workers, yet they are better able than low-wage work-
ers to move across employers with minimal earnings losses, and they are less likely
to leave their initial employer during a mass layoff.
Dauth, Findeisen, and Su¨dekum (2014) explore the impact of rising trade be-
tween Germany and China (and Eastern Europe) on employment in German local
labor markets over the period 1988 to 2008. They have a section discussing the
impact of Chinese and Eastern European countries import and export competition
on individual workers. They find that trade has a stabilizing effect on employment
relationships (within regions, local industries and plants). Bloom, Draca, and Van
Reenen (2011) examine the impact of firm exposure to Chinese import competi-
tion on patenting, IT, R&D and TFP using a panel of up to half a million firms over
1996-2007 across twelve European countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK). The
identification strategy they use is related to the one we use here in the sense that in
one of their specifications they use initial industry exposure to Chinese imports as
an instrument for subsequent Chinese import growth.
One further strand of the trade literature that looks at the impact of trade on
wages takes a structural approach by estimating general equilibrium models. This
literature generally assumes perfect labor mobility across industries. Accordingly,
labor market adjustments after (trade) shocks are very rapid and thus changes in
wages can be identified across (and not within) skill groups.9 A more recent ap-
proach to this modelling moves away from perfect worker mobility by introducing
search frictions, costly firm entry and exit, and industry-specific human capital.
These works primarily explore the effect of trade liberalization on labor market
dynamics and wage inequalities for developing countries.10 Our analysis is closely
related to this branch of the trade literature.
Another closely related strand of trade literature estimates the short- and medium-
run impacts of trade exposure on wages, employment, firm dynamics, worker
9See for example Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Harrigan (2000) and Blum (2008) for the US, and
Robertson (2004) for Mexico.
10See Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler, and Redding (2012), Cos¸ar (2013), and Dix-Carneiro (2011)
which use Brazilian data, whereas Cos¸ar, Guner, and Tybout (2011) uses data on Columbia. These
works analyse firm dynamics and labor market responses after a certain type of trade liberalization.
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turnover and inequality at different levels of aggregation.11 Workers are assumed
to face barriers to mobility across firms, occupations, industries or geographical
regions. Thus, the labor market adjustments to trade shocks are not immediate im-
plying costly transitory effects. However contrary to our study, this approach does
not permit the observation of effects which prevail after the reallocation process
has taken place.
2.4 Industry exposure to trade competition
2.4.1 Industry trade shocks
Following Autor et al. (2014), we use as a measure of trade exposure the change
in the import penetration ratio for a UK industry j over the period 1997-2011,
controlling for the industry pre-shock domestic absorption (or size of the industry j
before the shock occurs). More specifically, we define the change in industry trade
exposure as,
∆IPj,τ =
∆MUK,Cj,τ
Yj,96 +Mj,96 − Ej,96 , (2.1)
where ∆MUK,Cj,τ is the change in gross (net) imports between 1996 and 2011 from
China or from the EU to the UK in industry j, whilst Yj,96 is turnover, Mj,96 are
imports and Ej,96 are exports for industry j in 1996. The denominator represents
UK initial industry j absorption in 1996; that is before the shock occurs. The idea
is to capture the growth in UK gross (net) imports from China or from the EU that
is exclusively accounted by domestic supply shocks within the partner country or
changes in its trade cost structure.
We are concerned about estimating the causal effect of trade exposure on UK
workers’ career paths. More precisely, we are interested in isolating and estimating
the causal effect of internal domestic factors within the partner economy (China or
the EU) that caused their exports to grow substantially. Our measure of industry
trade exposure, as defined in (3.16), may be contaminated by domestic demand
shocks to the UK economy that might influence import demand. Indeed, part of
the observed changes in the import penetration ratio might be due to UK import
demand shocks that have nothing to do with factors driving China’s export growth
or trade relationship patterns with the EU.
11Articles analyzing trade shocks (i) at the plant level include Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006)
for the US, Verhoogen (2008) on Mexico, Amiti and Davis (2012) on Indonesia and Hummels, Jor-
gensen, Munch, and Xiang (2010) using Danish data; (ii) at the industry level, see Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2003), Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010), McLaren and Hakobyan (2010), Ebenstein,
Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips (2011), and Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011); and (iii) at the
regional level, see Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013a) who look at the impact of rising import compe-
tition from China on employment in US local labor markets. See also Chiquiar (2008), Kovak (2011,
2013) and Topalova (2005, 2010) analyzing primarily labor market consequences of trade reforms in
developing countries. See Bru¨lhart, Carre`re, and Trionfetti (2012) who analyze regional wages and
employment responses of trade liberalization in Austria following the fall of the Iron Curtain.
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So, in order to capture internal supply shocks transmitted into UK imports on
individual outcomes, we instrument ∆IPj,τ with:
∆IPOj,τ =
∆MO,Cj,τ
Yj,92 +Mj,92 − Ej,92 , (2.2)
where, ∆MO,Cj,τ is the change in gross (net) imports between 1996 and 2011 from
China (the EU) to non-UK high income countries in industry j, controlling for the
size of the UK industry in which the worker was working in 1992, four years prior
to the base period in (3.16).12 Consistent with the approach in Autor et al. (2014),
we use 1992 instead of 1996 to account for the potential sorting of workers across
industries in anticipation of future trade with China or with the EU.
The identification strategy relies on the idea that China’s export growth and EU
trade growth similarly affect other high income economies than the UK, provided
that supply shocks come from within the partner country, and that domestic demand
shocks are weakly correlated across high income countries. Therefore, construct-
ing an industry measure of trade exposure in the UK by using the one of other high
income countries identifies the supply-driven components of China’s export growth
and EU trade growth without any confounding effect of other shocks that simulta-
neously impact UK imports and workers’ outcomes (for example shocks originat-
ing from other common trade partners that are not China, the EU, the non-UK high
income economies or the non-UK OECD countries used in the instruments).
The quality of the identification strategy could be altered if three important
conditions are not fulfilled. First the explanatory power of the instruments must be
high enough in order to avoid a weak instrument problem (we present the first stage
statistics in each table to show that this is not the case). Second, if product demand
shocks are correlated across high-income economies, the IV estimates would be
potentially correlated with unobserved components of product demand. If this is
the case, our main estimators would tend to be biased toward zero and would not
be exempt from domestic shocks. In other words, the effect of import exposure on
earnings, employment and wages would be weaker than it truly is. Reassuringly
for us, Autor et al. (2014) find that this does not consist of a serious threat (see their
estimation based on a gravity-based model in their Table 11, p.1848).
The last and potentially the most serious threat to the identification strategy
may come from technological shocks affecting all high-income economies. If im-
port growth from China (the EU) is predominantly due to some global technologi-
cal shocks that push employment away from labor-intensive industries (i.e. indus-
tries in which China has a strong comparative advantage) or from more capital-
intensive industries (i.e. some industries in which the EU has a comparative ad-
vantage), then we would not be able to identify and isolate pure trade competition
12Non-UK high income countries to instrument for UK import penetration ratio from China are
Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland as in Autor et al.
(2014). Non-UK OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Republic
of Korea, Switzerland and the US) are used to instrument for UK import penetration ratio from the
EU.
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effects. In our estimation, we will try to control for this by including a large set
of initial-year industry and occupation characteristics. The novelty with respect to
Autor et al. (2014) is that our data permit us to control for the worker’s occupation
which will help us to discriminate between pure trade competition effects and pure
technological effects. Nonetheless, recent evidences suggest that advances in tech-
nology (e.g. automation) are not the main drivers of rising import competition from
low-income countries, and furthermore suggest that it is import competition from
China that enhances innovation in high-income countries rather than the converse
as shown by Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2011).
In addition to evaluating the direct impact of import competition on worker-
level outcomes, we are also interested in examining the impact of import com-
petition shocks that might be potentially transmitted through the purchase/sale of
intermediate inputs from/to other domestic neighbouring industries. To take an
example, imagine that industry j sells its largest share of intermediate inputs to do-
mestic industry k; we call industry k the neighbouring downstream industry. From
the perspective of a worker i employed in industry j, an increase in import pene-
tration in industry k, ceteris paribus, might be potentially detrimental in terms of
earnings, wages and employment. Indeed, if industry k is hit hard by import com-
petition, then some firms in industry k might decrease their purchases of interme-
diate inputs from industry j because of lower revenues and, thus, might negatively
affect workers in the neighbouring industry j. To identify such an effect, from the
perspective of industry j, we define the change in the neighbouring downstream
industry k trade exposure as,
∆IP downjk,τ =
∆MUK,Cjk,τ
Yk,96 +Mk,96 − Ek,96 , (2.3)
where, from the perspective of industry j, ∆MUK,Cjk,τ is the change in imports be-
tween 1996 and 2011 from China to the downstream industry k, controlling for
initial downstream industry k domestic absorption. The neighbouring downstream
industry k is identified as the industry purchasing the largest value of intermediate
inputs from industry j. Analogously, we can define the change in the neighbouring
upstream industry l trade exposure as,
∆IP upjl,τ =
∆MUK,Cjl,τ
Yl,96 +Ml,96 − El,96 , (2.4)
where, from the perspective of industry j, ∆MUK,Cjl,τ is the change in imports be-
tween 1996 and 2011 from China to the upstream industry l, controlling for initial
upstream industry l domestic absorption. The neighbouring upstream industry l is
identified as the one selling the largest value of intermediate inputs to industry j.
Our measures of indirect industry trade exposure, as defined in (2.3) and (2.4),
may also be contaminated by domestic demand shocks to the UK economy for the
exact same reasons than the measure of direct industry trade exposure, as defined
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in (3.16). Therefore, we employ an analogous type of instruments as in (3.18).
More precisely, we instrument IP downjk,τ and IP
up
jl,τ with respectively,
∆IPOdownjk,τ =
∆MO,Cjk,τ
Yk,92 +Mk,92 − Ek,92 , (2.5)
and,
∆IPOupjl,τ =
∆MO,Cjl,τ
Yl,92 +Ml,92 − El,92 , (2.6)
where, ∆MO,Cjk,τ and ∆M
O,C
jl,τ are the change in imports between 1996 and 2011
from China to non-UK high income countries in the neighbouring downstream
industry k and in the neighbouring upstream industry l respectively, controlling for
the size of the downstream and upstream industry in 1992, four years prior to the
base period in (3.16).13
2.4.2 The anatomy of gross imports from China
As first evidence of huge variations in UK industry gross import exposure from
China, Figure 2.5 shows the change in UK gross import values, in constant (2005)
millions of British pounds, from China over 1996 to 2011 for 21 broad manufac-
turing sectors. On the one hand, we can see that the biggest increases in imports
are in sectors such as apparel (+£3280 million), toys and miscellaneous manufac-
turing (+£2803 million), TVs (+£2613 million), office machinery and computers
(+£2536 million), electronics (+£2112 million), leather (+£1562 million) and tex-
tile (+£1357 million). These sectors are those that intensively use production work-
ers (sectors in which China has a strong comparative advantage). On the other
hand, in sectors such as tobacco (-£0.5 million), transport equipment (+£102 mil-
lion), pulp, paper and paperboard (+£222 million), printing and publishing (+£292
million), and food (+£333 million) the increase in imports have been far more
modest. Those sectors intensively use more natural resources or physical capital
inputs.
Interestingly, we can see that the sectors that have exhibited high imports from
China are very similar to those in the US (see Figure B.7 in the Appendix). Indeed,
the cross-country correlation coefficient between industry changes in gross imports
from China to the UK and from China to the US is 0.785 (p-value of 0.000).
To shed more light on the apparent relationship between UK industry import
exposure from China and the share of production workers employed, we plot in
Figure 2.6 on the horizontal axis the growth of industry import penetration from
China from 1996 to 2011 and on the vertical axis the share of production workers
in total industry employment in 1996. Each point on the graph represents a single
(5-digit) industry, whereas each label corresponds to one of the corresponding 21
13We use the same non-UK high income countries as in (3.18) to instrument for UK indirect import
penetration ratio from China.
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Figure 2.5: The change in imports from China to the UK, 1996-2011
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 21 consistently defined manufacturing sub-sectors.
Figure 2.6: Growth in trade exposure from China and the share of UK production
workers
Notes: For 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries. The sub-sectors are labeled at the
two-digit level. Import penetration is constructed using imports and exports from UN Comtrade and
turnover from the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). The share of production workers is taken from the
1995/6 Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS).
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broad manufacturing sectors. Focusing first on the broad sectors, the evidence sug-
gests that sectors with the biggest increase in import exposure from 1996 to 2011
tend to be those that were initially (i.e. in 1996) intensive in the use of produc-
tion workers. Accordingly, sectoral patterns of import growth are broadly consis-
tent with China’s comparative advantage in sectors that use intensively production
workers (Amiti and Freund, 2010).
However, differences in factor intensity cannot be the entire story. Figure 2.6
shows a large variation in the change in import penetration within the broad man-
ufacturing sectors (which tend to be quite similar in terms of production worker
intensity use). In the empirical analysis, we will include controls for eight broad
manufacturing sectors, leading to an identification of the effect of trade competition
on medium- to long-run outcomes among industries with similar skill-intensity re-
quirement in production. Autor et al. (2014) provides similar evidence for the
US between 1991 and 2007. In their study, they also identify sectors intensive in
the use of production worker as being exposed to high import growth from China
(pp10-11).
2.4.3 The anatomy of gross imports from the European Union
Along with the emergence of China, UK’s close trade ties with the EU are expected
to have a sizable impact on the dynamics of its labor market. Figure 2.7 replicates
Figure 2.5 but using import growth from the EU (instead of China). A totally
different pattern emerges. The change in gross import values from the EU to the
UK is high in sectors such as chemicals (+£11107 million), food products (+£6720
million), motor vehicles (+£5296 million) and metals (+£5296 million), whereas
sectors such as office machinery (-£3229 million), TVs (-£1456 million), pulp,
paper and paperboard (-£694 million) and textiles (-£619 million) experienced a
negative change in gross import values from the EU.
Again, UK industry trade patterns with the EU look similar to those in the
US (see Figure B.8 in the Appendix) with a cross-country correlation coefficient
between industry changes in gross imports from the EU to the UK and from the EU
to the US equals to 0.865 (p-value of 0.000). These figures imply that the sectors
that experienced high growth in gross imports from the EU differ to those that
faced high imports from China in terms of the intensity of their use of production
workers. Indeed, this observation is confirmed by Figure 2.8, which replicates
Figure 2.6 with the growth of gross import penetration ratio coming from the EU
(instead of China) on the horizontal axis. Industries with the biggest increase in
import exposure from 1996 to 2011 tended to be those that were initially (i.e. in
1996) not that intensive in the use of production workers, but more intensive in the
use of capital or natural resources.
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Figure 2.7: The change in imports from the EU to the UK, 1996-2011
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 21 consistently defined manufacturing sub-sectors.
Figure 2.8: Growth in trade exposure from the EU and the share of UK production
workers
Notes: For 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries. The sub-sectors are labeled at the
two-digit level. Import penetration is constructed using imports and exports from UN Comtrade and
turnover from the ABI. The share of production workers is taken from the 1995/6 QLFS. To make
the figure comparable with figure 8, import penetration from the EU for the manufacture of essential
oils (2463) is 0.990 but set to 0.8, also precious metal production (2741) is set to 0.8 but is 2.26. The
correlation coefficient between UK IP from China and Europe is 0.264 with a p-value of 0.001.
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2.5 Empirical methodology and data
2.5.1 Data sources
Our primary source of data are taken from the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset
(NESPD) which is a one percent random sample of UK workers who have the
same last two digits in their National Insurance number. This data set is made
available by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and began in 1975. The NE-
SPD follows workers throughout their working life collecting information on their
earnings, number of hours worked, place of work, age, gender, industry and oc-
cupation of employment. More importantly, the NESPD picks up workers after
an unemployment spell. Thus if they leave employment they leave the survey but
when they re-enter employment again they re-enter the survey.
Following Autor et al. (2014), we select a sample of workers with high labor
market attachment. This consists of full-time workers age 21 to 64, who were born
between 1947 and 1975, with non-zero earnings in 1992-1994 and 1995-1997.
Most of our estimations for the impact of trade exposure on worker’s career out-
comes are based on workers observed between 1997 and 2011. We use data from
pre-sample years in order to construct control variables. We use five main worker
outcomes over the sample period: cumulative earnings, the number of years with
positive earnings, cumulative earnings per year in years with non-zero earnings,
cumulative hourly pay and cumulative hours of work. Table B.1 in the Appendix
provides detailed summary statistics.
International bilateral trade data are taken from the United Nations Commodity
Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). We use detailed bilateral commodity
import and export flows from 1988 to 2011 for most partner countries. Product
values are classified according to the Standard International Trade Classification,
revision 3 (SITC, rev.3) at the 5-digit level in current US dollars. To concord
these data to 5-digit 1992 UK Standard Industrial Classification (UKSIC 1992)
industries, we constructed a crosswalk table that maps any 5-digit SITC product to
at least one 5-digit UKSIC 1992 industry (see the Appendix Section B.3 for more
details). Trade flows were converted into constant (2005) GBP using historical
exchange rates and the UK Consumer Price Index (CPI).14
In order to assess the indirect worker-level impact of import competition along
the value chain, we need to identify for each industry their respective closest up-
stream and downstream manufacturing neighbour. For this purpose, we use the
1995 Analytical Input-Output Tables (I-O) from the ONS. The I-O Tables report in-
formation on production linkages between industries at a disaggregated level based
on Input-Output industry groups (called IO123).15 For an industry j, we define
14Historical yearly GBP/USD exchange rates are provided by oanda.com. UK CPI is taken from
the World Bank.
15The IO123 classification is based on an aggregated version of UKSICs with 123 different in-
dustries in total (of which 77 are manufacturing industries). Thus, the level of disaggregation is less
detailed than 5-digit UKSIC industries. See Section 2.6.3 for an explanation on how this impact on
our results.
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its closest downstream (upstream) neighbouring industry as the industry that buys
(sells) the largest value of intermediate inputs from (to) industry j.
2.5.2 Estimating equation
Direct impact of import competition
Following Autor et al. (2014), we estimate the effect of trade exposure on individ-
ual worker outcomes with the following specification:
Eij,τ = β0 + β1∆IPj,τ + β2IPj,96 +X
′
ij,96β3 + Z
′
j,96β4 + εij,τ , (2.7)
where, Eij,τ is one of the five main worker outcomes between 1997 and 2011 for
worker i in industry j. ∆IPj,τ is the change in gross (net) import penetration from
China (the EU) over the period 1996 to 2011 in industry j as defined in (3.16).
IPj,96 is import penetration in 1996 in industry j; Xij,96 is a vector of worker
characteristics in 1996; and Zj,96 is a vector of industry/occupation controls in
1996.
The vector of worker characteristics include the worker’s birth year, gender,
indicators for the size of the primary firm (4 dummies), indicators for job tenure at
the initial firm (4 dummies) in 1996, mean log annual earnings over 1990 to 1996
(also interacted with age) and the change in log earnings over the period 1990 to
1996.
The vector of industry/occupation controls include the industry net capital stock,
the industry share of production workers, the industry average log wage, the indus-
try share of imported intermediate inputs in total intermediate consumption, the
industry share of IT equipment in total domestic output, the industry share of com-
puter equipment in total domestic output, import penetration by countries other
than China (the EU), eight sub-sector dummies and two-digit occupation dummies
(more details to follow). All of our controls are measured in 1996. Standard errors
are clustered at the 3-digit industry level. Following Autor et al. (2014), we model
the cumulative shock due to trade exposure as a function of import penetration ra-
tio in 1996 (the initial condition) plus the subsequent growth in import penetration
ratio over 1996 to 2011 (the average annual change).
The biggest challenge in estimating equation (2.7) is that industries that face
increasing import competition might be exposed to other shocks that could be
wrongly attributed to trade. To control for such confounding factors, we include a
large set of industry and occupation (initial-year) controls observed in 1996. Our
main specification includes the industry net capital stock, the industry share of IT
equipment in total domestic output, the industry share of computer equipment in
total domestic output and the industry share of production workers in employment,
all of which might indicate the degree of industry exposure to technical change
(Doms, Dunne, and Troske, 1997; Autor, Katz, and Krueger, 1998). Moreover, the
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specification includes the industry share of imported intermediate inputs in total in-
termediate consumption, as in Feenstra and Hanson (1999), and import penetration
by countries other than China (the EU) in order to capture overall industry exposure
to trade in final goods and offshoring. Finally, we also include the industry average
log wage, eight sub-sector dummies and two digit occupation dummies. The in-
clusion of the occupation controls is a novelty which enables us to evaluate import
competition effects within detailed occupation groups. One would expect workers
employed in low-skill intensive occupations to exhibit declining earnings profiles
as a consequence of trade compared to other workers within the same occupation;
and not just workers relative to all workers across all occupations, which could be
a consequence of skill biased technical change instead of pure trade effects.
Our analysis compares workers with similar individual characteristics, similar
initial earnings, similar initial experience on the job, similar initial employer size,
who are initially employed in similar occupation and with similar average indus-
try characteristics, some of whom work in industries that face increases in trade
competition and some of whom do not.
Indirect impact of import competition
To examine the indirect impact of import competition on workers employed in
neighbouring industries, we augment the main estimating equation (2.7) as follows:
Eij,τ = γ0 + γ1∆IPj,τ + γ2∆IP
down
jk,τ + γ3∆IP
up
jl,τ
+ C
′
j,96γ4 +X
′
ij,96γ5 + Z
′
j,96γ6 + µij,τ , (2.8)
where, k indexes the neighbouring downstream industry relative to industry j and l
indexes the neighbouring upstream industry relative to industry j. Along with the
direct change in gross import penetration in industry j, ∆IPj,τ , we include the two
additional measures of indirect exposure to import competition, namely ∆IP downjk,τ
and ∆IP upjl,τ as defined in (2.3) and (2.4) respectively. Xij,96 and Zj,96 are respec-
tively the same vectors of worker characteristics and industry/occupation controls
in 1996 as those used in equation (2.7) except that the 8 sub-sector dummies are
not included (more on this in Section 2.6.3). Cj,96 is a vector containing import
penetration in industry j, import penetration in downstream neighbouring industry
k and import penetration in upstream neighbouring industry l in 1996.
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2.6 The labor market effect of increased exposure to im-
port competition from China
2.6.1 Baseline results
Table 2.1 presents our estimates for the relationship between UK gross import ex-
posure from China and cumulative earnings over 1997 to 2011 based on equa-
tion (2.7). We restrict the sample to full time workers (as noted in section 3.2.1).
Initially, we regress cumulative earnings on the change in gross import penetra-
tion from China and a full set of birth-year dummies to account for life-cycle
variations in earnings. Column 1 provides the OLS estimates and column 2 the
2SLS estimates using the variable defined in equation (3.18) as our instrument.
In both columns, we find a negative and statistically significant relationship be-
tween the change in gross import penetration and cumulative earnings over 1997
to 2011. Thus, higher exposure to gross import competition from China (based on
a worker’s initial industry) is related to lower cumulative earnings over the subse-
quent 15 years.
In order to quantify our results we compare a manufacturing worker at the 75th
percentile of the change in trade exposure with a manufacturing worker at the 25th
percentile. The value of the change in gross import penetration from China is 0.26
percentage points at the 25th percentile and is 5.97 percentage points at the 75th
percentile. So using column 1, the implied differential for a reduction in earnings
over the 15 year sample period, between workers at the 75th percentile relative to
the 25th percentile is 63.7% of initial annual earnings.16Using the 2SLS estimates
from column 2, the implied differential increases to 76.7% of initial annual earn-
ings.17The 2SLS estimate is substantially higher than the OLS estimate suggesting
that the potential positive correlation between UK industry import demand shocks
and UK industry labor demand should not to be ignored.
In the three subsequent columns, we add controls for whether the worker is
female (column 3), the size of the worker’s initial firm and the worker’s work
experience at the initial firm (column 4). We also add controls for the worker’s
earnings histories (column 5) including their mean log annual earnings and the
change in their log earnings over the period 1990 to 1996. Note that the inclusions
of the gender dummy and earnings history have a notable impact on the estimates.
In order to control for cross-industry heterogeneity in exposure to other shocks
that might be confounded with import shocks, we add an extensive list of industry
and occupation-level control variables in the four subsequent columns. Column 6
includes the initial gross import penetration from China and from all other coun-
tries except China to account for overall industry exposure to trade in final goods.
In column 7, we add initial industry controls such as average industry log wage,
industry net capital stock, industry share of IT equipment in total domestic out-
put, industry share of computer equipment in total domestic output and industry
16The computation is 11.162× (5.97− 0.26) = 63.73.
17The computation is 13.439× (5.97− 0.26) = 76.74.
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share of production workers in employment, all of which might indicate the de-
gree of industry exposure to technical change (Doms, Dunne, and Troske, 1997;
Autor, Katz, and Krueger, 1998). Moreover, column 7 includes the industry share
of imported intermediate inputs in total intermediate consumption (as in Feenstra
and Hanson, 1999) which (roughly) controls for industry exposure to offshoring.
Column 8 adds two-digit level occupation dummies and thus in this column we are
comparing the outcomes of manufacturing workers who are initially performing
different tasks within the same detailed occupation. Finally, column 9 adds dum-
mies for eight manufacturing sub-sectors, so that we are comparing outcomes for
manufacturing workers who are initially working in different industries within the
same sub-sector. This is our preferred specification and provides an estimate of -
8.410 which is strongly significant.18The first stage is also strong and demonstrates
an F-statistic of 55.583 supporting the use of Chinese imports to other high income
countries as an instrument for Chinese imports to the UK.
From column 9 the implied differential for a reduction in earnings over the
15 year sample period, between workers at the 75th percentile relative to the 25th
percentile of the change in import penetration is 48%.19This is very similar, albeit
slightly larger, to that found by Autor et al. (2014) even though our estimate com-
pares workers within two digit occupation. For the US, Autor et al. (2014) find an
implied differential for a reduction in earnings over 16 years, between workers at
the 75th percentile relative to the 25th percentile of around 46%.
18The inclusion of the industry dummies in column 9 does substantially change the estimates.
The coefficient on the change in gross import penetration from China in column 9 is roughly 40%
lower than that in column 8 suggesting, that even controlling for input intensity use, a lot of variation
remains. Also the coefficient on the change in import exposure from column 9 is smaller than that
from column 2 whereas Autor et al. (2014) find the converse. This suggests that conditional on our
demographic measures (which are controlled for in each column), workers with somewhat lower
potential earnings are initially employed in industries that experienced higher import exposure in
subsequent years.
19The computation is 8.410× (5.97− 0.26) = 48.02.
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As an alternative labor market outcome measure, we use the number of years
(between 1997 and 2011) that workers have experienced non-zero earnings. The
intention here is to roughly capture the extensive margin of employment (and to
compare our results with those in Autor et al. (2014)). If an individual works a
single day in a year, they will have non-zero earnings in that year. Consequently,
any periods of unemployment that are less than a year in duration are unobserved.
The specifications in columns 1 to 9 of Table 2.2 are directly comparable to those in
Table 2.1. Again, we find a strongly significantly negative relationship between the
change in gross import exposure and years of non-zero earnings. Again column 9
is our preferred specification and this implies that Chinese import exposure reduces
subsequent employment. The employment differential for a manufacturing worker
at the 75th percentile of import exposure relative to a worker at the 25th percentile
is 18.8% of a year, which is 69 days or almost 10 weeks lost during the 15-year
sample period.20
In Table 2.3, we further consider three additional outcome measures, namely
cumulative earnings per year, cumulative hourly pay and cumulative hours of work.
Hourly pay captures the intensive margin of gross annual earnings and cumula-
tive hours of work captures the extensive margin of gross annual earnings more
accurately than the number of years with non-zero earnings. We also now con-
sider changes in net import penetration (rather than gross import penetration) from
China in the lower panel. Focusing first on the upper panel, we can see that in-
creased gross import exposure has a negative and significant impact on cumulative
earnings per year (column 3), on average hourly pay (column 4) and on cumulative
hours of work (column 5), with a bigger magnitude on the wage than on hours of
work. Indeed, the implied reduction in total wage earnings for a manufacturing
worker at the 75th percentile of import exposure relative to a worker at the 25th per-
centile is 69.2% of initial wage (in 1996), whereas the fall in employment is 33.6%
of the total number of hours worked in 1996. This suggests that the adjustment to
trade shocks is more severe at the intensive margin relative to the extensive mar-
gin. To account for the potential new export opportunities that China’s economic
opening might offer (which might temper some of the loss incurred by gross im-
port competition), the lower panel shows that for net imports each point estimate
is larger (in absolute value) and with larger 75th-25th percentile differentials. This
suggests that what really hurts UK manufacturing workers is the difference in the
nature of imports and exports. Worth mentioning, the point estimates of net im-
port growth on hourly pay and on hours of work are respectively 89.8% and 50.7%
larger than the corresponding ones using gross import growth.
20The computation is 3.288× (5.97− 0.26) = 18.78.
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In order to explore the dynamics within our observed period, we again follow
Autor et al. (2014) by plotting the estimated impact of gross import exposure on
specific worker outcomes by year for the years 1993 through 2011 using our pre-
ferred specification. The upper panel in Figure 2.9 illustrates the estimated impact
of gross import exposure on worker earnings per year on average. As expected,
the trade effects are zero before the trade shock in 1996. But thereafter trade expo-
sure has an adverse effect (though not significantly different from zero for most of
the year) on earnings between 1996 and 2011 (except in 1998), although this does
exhibit some degree of convergence after approximately nine years. The second
panel provides the results for the probability of having non-zero earnings in each
year. This suggests a similar pattern to earnings loss which again starts to converge
back to zero after around eight years. The third panel provides earnings losses for a
sub-sample of workers who never exhibit zero earnings. For these workers, relative
earnings continue to decline, with no signs of convergence.
Figure 2.10 plots hourly pay by year (upper panel) and hours of work by year
(lower panel). For both, we can see that rising imports from China adversely affect
annual wages and employment for the entire sample period, with wages suffering
slightly more than employment (which is consistent with the findings of Table 2.3).
Interestingly, wages seem to stabilize from 2004 onwards, whereas employment
shows a converging path from 2000 onwards.
2.6.2 Results by one-digit occupation
One advantage that the NESPD has over the data used in Autor et al. (2014) is that
it contains information on the occupations of workers enabling us to look at trade
exposure effects separately by occupation. Table 2.4 provides estimates for gross
import exposure from China on our five main worker outcome measures (as per the
upper panel of Table 2.3) estimated separately by one-digit occupation. In order to
maintain sensible sample sizes it was necessary to combine personal service occu-
pations, sales and customer service and elementary occupations into one composite
group. This provides seven one-digit occupation groups for managers, profession-
als, associate professionals, clerical/secretarial, skilled trades, plant/machine oper-
ators and personal/sales/ elementary occupations.
In column 1, increased trade exposure adversely affects the cumulative earn-
ings of managers, skilled trades and personal/sales/elementary occupations. Man-
agers and skilled trades suffer substantially from import competition with an im-
plied differential of 107% and 102% respectively. However, as it could be expected
personal/sales/elementary occupations experience the biggest reduction in cumu-
lative earnings, with an implied differential of 157%. For the other occupation
groups, increased import growth seems to exert a negative effect on earnings as
well, although the estimates are not statistically significant.
Looking at cumulative wages in column 4, we can see a similar pattern emerg-
ing as in column 1. Namely, managers and skilled trades are mostly affected by
increased import exposure with an implied 75th-25th percentile differential is 149%
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and 127% respectively, whereas in the bottom of the occupation distribution only
plant/machine operators see their wages declining in response to Chinese import
competition (-41%). Moreover, as seen in column 5, managers also see their em-
ployment decreasing in response to rising trade competition, highlighting the fact
that “white-collar” workers seem those suffering the most relative to all other oc-
cupation groups. The implied differential for a reduction in employment over the
15 year-sample period is 82.5% of total hours of work in 1996 for managers. In
column 5, employment for clerical and secretarial occupations is also negatively
affected, whereas their wages (in column 4) do not seem to react to import compe-
tition shocks suggesting an adjustment only at the extensive margin for this group
of workers. Interestingly, managers are the only occupation group seeing a de-
crease in both margins.
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Figure 2.9: Year-by-year regression results for main outcomes, 1993-2011
Source: Own estimations based on merged COMTRADE-NESPD database.
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Figure 2.10: Year-by-year regression results for additional outcomes, 1993-2011
Source: Own estimations based on merged COMTRADE-NESPD database.
In Table 2.5, as an alternative to occupation dummies, we include a measure
of routine tasks intensity in 1996 for each occupation at the three-digit level of
disaggregation. The routine intensity measure is defined as the share of routine
task inputs for each occupation as in Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003). We used
information about the content of tasks from the US Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (DOT). Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) made available a dataset contain-
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ing five different measures of task activity for each job based on 1980 US Census
Code.21In order to take advantage of those task measures, we constructed a cross-
walk that matches any 1980 Census Code to their nearest 3-digit UK 2000 Standard
Occupational Classification (UKSOC 2000) code.22The estimates suggest that con-
trolling for the routine intensity of a job does not alter the results qualitatively and
quantitatively. Indeed, the main coefficients and the 75th-25th implied differentials
are not greatly affected compared to what is found in the upper panel of Table 2.3
(which controls for two digit occupations).
These results are consistent with those found in the US since Autor, Dorn, and
Hanson (2013b) also find large negative effects from Chinese trade competition on
US non-production jobs. In their paper, they explore the effects of technology and
trade on employment in US local labor markets and find that Chinese import com-
petition has an adverse employment effect on non-production workers (alongside a
less surprising negative employment effect on production workers).23
Again we can plot the estimated impact of gross import exposure on specific
worker outcomes by year for each occupation group, although we can only look at
earnings and non-zero earnings probabilities as a consequence of smaller sample
sizes. The upper panel in Figure 2.11 supports the findings of Table 2.4 that trade
exposure has the largest adverse effect on earnings at both ends of the occupation
distribution (for white-collar and low-skilled blue-collar workers). The lower panel
shows that the decline in earnings is partly due to a rise in zero-earnings years,
again we find a larger decline for managers, professionals, associate professionals
an elementary workers. Interestingly, both the earnings and the probability of being
in employment never fully converge for professionals, associate professionals and
elementary workers. This is not the case for managers and skilled trades whose
earnings and employment likelihood seem to converge to zero in 2011. Somewhat
surprisingly, Figure 2.11 shows that the group least affected by Chinese import
competition, in terms of earnings and non-zero earnings probabilities by year, is
plant/machine operators. A result that is in line with the findings of Table 2.4
21The resource used is called DOT means by occupation and is available on David Autor’s MIT
webpage, in the Data Archive section. The task measures were derived from 1991 revised 4th edition
of the DOT. See Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) for more information.
22We used the online CASCOT tool (Computer Assisted Structured COding Tool) freely provided
by the University of Warwick. Click here for the link. Cascot ”is a computer program designed to
make the coding of text information to standard classifications simpler, quicker and more reliable”
(Warwick Institute for Employment Research).
23See their Table 4 on page 20.
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Figure 2.11: Year-by-year regression results for main outcomes by one-digit occu-
pation, 1993-2011
Source: Own estimations based on merged COMTRADE-NESPD database.
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2.6.3 Indirect effect
Table 2.6 presents our estimates when including downstream and upstream neigh-
bouring industry’s gross import exposure from China on our five main worker out-
come measures over 1997 to 2011 based on equation (2.8). Important to note is that
the 8 sub-sector dummies are not included as controls. The reason is that due to
the level of disaggregation of the I-O Tables, the majority of identified downstream
and upstream industries are in different sub-sectors than their corresponding sourc-
ing and purchasing industry.24Therefore, constrained by the data we are only able
to capture between, rather than within, sub-sectors effects.25
We can see that the negative relationship between the direct change in gross im-
port penetration and each of the five dependent variables remains highly significant.
In fact, the inclusion of the two indirect measures of Chinese import competition
slightly increases the precision of each point estimate. Moreover, each coefficient
on direct change in import exposure seems unaffected by the inclusion of indirect
change in gross import penetration.26
Increased import growth in the upstream neighbouring industry tends to have
a positive effect on cumulative annual earnings and negative ones on cumulative
hourly pay and hours of work, although the point estimates are not statistically sig-
nificant. In contrast, the findings in columns 4 and 5 suggest that increased import
competition in the downstream industry has a negative and significant impact on
wages and hours of work. The implied 75th-25th percentile differential for wages
and hours of work are respectively -46.9% and -24.8%, suggesting that, from the
perspective of a given industry, increased import competition in the industry that
purchases the biggest amount of inputs from them leads to a additional detrimental
effect on both margins of employment.
24Of the 73 identified downstream and upstream sectors, respectively 77.8% and 75.3% are in
different 1-digit UKSIC industries than their corresponding neighbour.
25As expected, if we include the eight sub-sector dummies, the coefficients on both indirect import
exposure measures turn insignificantly different from zero, whereas the coefficients on the direct ef-
fect of import exposure are unaffected in all columns relative to those in the upper panel of Table 2.3.
26We now have to contrast those point estimates with the corresponding ones in columns 8 of
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. That is the column estimating the impact of Chinese import competition
without controlling for the eight sub-sector dummies.
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2.7. RESULTS: IMPORT COMPETITION FROM THE EU 57
2.7 The labor market effect of increased exposure to im-
port competition from the European Union
In this section, we explore the nature of trade with China and compare that to trade
with the EU. Figure 2.12 shows that UK bilateral trade patterns with China are
mainly in the form of inter-industry trade, whereas Figure 2.13 shows that UK
bilateral trade relationships with the EU are mainly in the form of intra-industry
trade. This makes the EU an interesting point of reference, given that overall trade
has increased in a similar way to that with China. This is also the case for the US as
shown in Figures B.9 and B.10 in the Appendix. We would then expect a different
impact on worker-level outcomes whether import competition stem from China or
the EU.
Figure 2.12: The nature of trade between the UK and China, 1988-2012
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries.
In order to compare the impact of import penetration from China with that
from the EU we re-estimate our preferred specification for all five of our outcome
variables further conditioning on the change in import penetration from the EU
(over 1996 to 2011) and the import penetration from the EU in 1996. This is
analogous to Table 2.3 where we look at gross imports in the upper panel and net
imports in the lower panel.
Table 2.7 presents the results using the change in gross import penetration from
China and from the EU simultaneously. On the one hand, the table shows that the
impact of gross Chinese import growth on all outcomes is still negative and signifi-
cant and these estimates remain mostly unaffected by the inclusion of gross import
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Figure 2.13: The nature of trade between the UK and the EU, 1988-2012
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Notes: The EU consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries.
from the EU. On the other hand, increased gross imports from the EU are asso-
ciated with positive worker-level outcomes with the estimates being statistically
significant in all columns. However, the positive effects of import competition
from the EU are not large enough to compensate for the negative effects of Chi-
nese competition.
The estimates in Table 2.8 show that the adverse effect of net import com-
petition from China is much larger than for gross imports, confirming that UK
industries have been exposed to a major rise in imports from China without a coun-
terbalancing rise in demand from China for exports. However, net import growth
from the EU now implies positive or negative exposure shocks, though these are
largely not statistically different from zero.27 Overall, the findings suggest that im-
ports from the EU might not be substitutes to domestic production, but are rather
complements.28
27Moreover, as one can see in Table 2.8, the F-stat on the excluded instrument for EU import
growth is low at 4.4, suggesting that the point estimates might suffer from a weak instrument issue.
28We use the change in trade exposure from the EU with respect to non-UK OECD countries (i.e.
Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Switzerland and the US)
as an instrument for the change in trade exposure from the EU with respect to the UK. In unreported
results in which we use as an instrument the change in trade exposure from the EU with respect to
the Denmark, we find similar results.
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2.8 Conclusion
The emergence of low and middle-income countries in the global economic land-
scape, mainly driven by China’s transition to a market-oriented economy, has re-
vived academic interest in the effects of trade competition on worker adjustment.
China is an economy that converges toward the global technology frontier in re-
sponse to major changes in domestic policy. Using a unique longitudinal dataset
of individual worker characteristics for the UK over an extended period of time,
we have exploited this recent surge in exports to analyze how UK manufacturing
workers adjust to trade competition.
The UK’s close trade ties with the EU have had a sizable impact on its labor
market. Indeed, as trade theory predicts, trade with countries of any income level
my affect domestic workers, although the impact largely depends on the nature
of trade and where the imports originate from. We provide unique evidence that
the effects of import competition from the EU did not have an adverse effect on
the labor market outcomes of UK workers, and moreover may even have had a
complementary effect. This is largely a consequence of the nature of trade being
intra- rather than inter-industry. Conversely trade exposure from China has led to
lower cumulative earnings, wages and hours of work between 1997 and 2011. The
implied differential for a reduction in earnings over the 15 year sample period, be-
tween workers at the 75th percentile of industry trade exposure relative to workers
at the 25th percentile is 48% of initial annual earnings. The drop in wages is equal
to 69.2% of initial total wages and hours worked are lower by 33.6% of total hours
worked in the initial year.
The impact of trade competition differs across occupation groups, which high-
lights the great heterogeneity in trade adjustment by job characteristics. Occu-
pations such as managers, skilled trades and elementary production are most ad-
versely affected by the rise in Chinese imports. Somewhat unexpectedly we find
that the adverse effects of increased imports from China are most pronounced
among managers and least pronounced among plant/machine operators.
Finally, we provide evidence of import competition shocks being transmit-
ted through the purchase of intermediate inputs into worker-level outcomes in the
sourcing industry. We have found that increased imports from China in an industry
located further down the value chain (i.e. the downstream industry) have adverse
effects on wages and hours worked in the sourcing (i.e. upstream) industry. Such
an effect might be explain by the fact that firms in the downstream industry are
hit by a negative revenue shock, which is potentially transmitted to the sourcing
industry through lower purchases of intermediate inputs. The additional implied
differential for a reduction in wages and hours worked over the 15 year sample pe-
riod, between workers at the 75th percentile of downstream industry trade exposure
relative to workers at the 25th percentile is respectively 46.9% and 24.8%.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Trade and
Exchange Rate Shocks on Wages
in Switzerland
ARNAUD JOYE
I explore the impact of industry-level exposure to trade and real ex-
change rate shocks on individual-level wages for Swiss manufacturing
workers over the period 1996-2008. This study proposes three main
complements from the existing literature. First, I propose a gravity-
type estimation strategy as a first-stage step to construct instrumental
variables designed to consistently estimate the causal effect of changes
in trade on workers’ wages. Second, I focus on individual-level data,
which enables to analyze the impact of trade and exchange rates within
skill groups, occupations and industry characteristics. Third, I focus
on a small open economy by drawing on data for Switzerland. This
study shows that industry exposure to trade and exchange rate shocks
influences wages of manufacturing workers of various groups differ-
ently. I show that the impact is concentrated among high-skilled and
blue-collar workers almost exclusively. I also provide evidence that
exchange rate effects are potentially heterogeneous across industries
with different market structures. Wages of workers employed in in-
dustries that predominantly produce homogeneous goods are shown
to be more responsive to exchange rates movements than those work-
ing in industries that predominantly produce differentiated varieties.
JEL Codes: F14, F16, J31
Keywords: wage, import competition, export share, real exchange rates, market
structure
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3.1 Introduction
At least since Stolper and Samuelson (1941), economists have been interested in
studying the effect of globalization on the labor market. The literature to date
has been somewhat US centric and focused mainly on aggregate outcomes (e.g.
Feenstra and Hanson, 1999). However, exposure to foreign shocks are expected to
have more sizeable effects on small open economies such as Switzerland. Indeed
the Swiss economy is highly dependent on exports and imports, and exposed to
significant currency swings. According to the Open Markets Index report from the
International Chamber of Commerce, Switzerland was the 11th most open economy
out of 75 countries in 2013. The importance of exports and imports in the Swiss
economy coupled with the recent abandon of the exchange rate ceiling by the Swiss
National Bank call for a better comprehension of the effects of trade and exchange
rates. Alas, to my knowledge no study exploring the impact of trade and exchange
rate shocks on Swiss workers has been carried out.1
Therefore, this paper explores the impact of industry-level exposure to trade
and exchange rate movements on individual-level wages of Swiss manufacturing
workers over the period 1996-2008. Focusing on individual-level data is particu-
larly appropriate for studying the relationship between wages, and trade and ex-
change rate shocks as analyses relying on more aggregated data could miss hetero-
geneous effects in workers with different characteristics. The standard approach
to estimating the effect of import competition is to use fluctuation in the prices or
quantities of imported goods across industries over time as an exogenous shock
and explore the impact on industry-specific labor-market outcomes.2 This study
explores a similar route, yet the individual-level information at hand enables to
analyze the impact of trade and exchange rates on wages of workers sharing sim-
ilar characteristics in many dimensions, as well as the effect within skill groups,
occupations and industry characteristics.
This paper contributes to a rapidly growing literature estimating the labor-
market consequences of globalization at the individual, firm, industry or region
level.3 At the individual level, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014) looks at the
medium-term impact of increased import competition from China on earnings and
employment in the US economy, whereas Bru¨lhart, Joye, and Lindley (2015) ex-
plores similar effects stemming from China or the European Union for the United
Kingdom. In both studies, it is shown that increased import growth coming from
China has significant and negative effects on workers’ earnings. On the contrary,
Bru¨lhart et al. (2015) find that increased gross imports from the European Union
1A recent paper by Kaiser and Siegenthaler (2014) explores the relationship between real ex-
change rate movements and firms’ skill demand in Switzerland. However, their data do not permit
them to look at the individual-level consequences of exchange rate swings.
2See for example Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Harrigan (2000) for the US.
3See for example Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) or Amiti and Davis (2012) on trade and
firms; Revenga (1992) or Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) on trade and industries; and
Bru¨lhart, Carre`re, and Trionfetti (2012) or Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013a) on trade and regions.
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are associated with positive worker-level outcomes, while increase in net imports
are not. My work complements theirs by using data for Switzerland, which is of
particular interest for two reasons. First, Switzerland’s trade-to-GDP ratio is high
(91.2% over the sample period 1996-2008) suggesting that the average manufac-
turing industry relies heavily on exports and imports. Second, the movements of
the swiss currency can be safely regarded as exogenous shocks to Swiss industries,
as the swiss franc acts as a safe haven currency in times of economic and financial
instability.
Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips (2014) study the short-term im-
pact of industry and occupational exposure to trade and offshoring shocks on wages
of US workers. They find that occupational exposure is associated with signifi-
cant wage effects, while industry exposure has no significant impact. My work is
closely related to their study, since it also focuses on the short-term impact of trade
on wages, yet I additionally propose a gravity-type estimation strategy as a first-
stage step to construct instrumental variables designed to consistently estimate the
causal effect of trade shocks on wages. Indeed, the estimated impact of trade may
be potentially contaminated by domestic demand shocks to the Swiss economy that
might influence import demand and export opportunities. Part of the observed fluc-
tuations in trade might be due to changes in the domestic labor market that have
nothing to do with factors driving foreign competition. If changes in trade flows
partly reflect domestic shocks to Swiss industries, then this reverse causality would
undermine the interpretation of the results.
Another potential threats that might invalidate our estimates is the probable
correlation between technological change and trade shocks. One usual suspect is
automation; for example if the wage of low-skilled workers are disproportionately
affected by automation and, at the same time, those workers suffer relatively more,
say, from import competition, then it would cast doubts on the causal interpretation
of the results and bias the OLS estimation towards zero. I attempt to address the
potential correlation between technological change and trade shocks by control-
ling for time-varying industry characteristics, as well as including individual-level
characteristics, and 4-digit occupation and education fixed-effects.
My work also contributes to the literature that estimates the link between ex-
change rate movements and employment or wages (e.g. Campa and Goldberg,
2001, at the industry level). A closely related strand of literature examines the
effect of exchange rate movements on workers using household survey data, as I
do. The number of papers that explore these effects is relatively small and focuses
mainly on the US (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003) and Mexico (Robertson, 2003,
2004). I therefore complement existing studies by drawing on data for Switzerland
which have not been analyzed in this particular context to date.
Another related branch of the literature is interested in the relationship between
exchange rate fluctuations and labor demand. Nucci and Pozzolo (2010, 2014)
estimate the implications for firm-level wages and employment of changes in ex-
change rate for Italy. In a similar manner, Kaiser and Siegenthaler (2014) explore
the relationship between real exchange rate movements and firms’ skill demand in
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Switzerland. My study is complementary to the latter, because their data do not
permit them to look at the individual-level consequences of exchange rates swings.
This study shows that industry real exchange rate movements and trade ex-
posure influence wages of manufacturing workers of various groups differently.
When averaged across all workers, the overall impact of trade on wages appears
small but statistically significant: a 10% increase in import penetration leads to
a drop of 0.39% in wages, while a 10% increase in the export share implies a
0.53% increase in wages. In contrast, exchange rates movements do not seem to
influence average wages. However, for some specific groups, effects can be larger.
The impact of import penetration ratios, export shares and exchange rates swings
are concentrated among high-skilled and blue-collar workers almost exclusively.
Overall, the net effect of trade shocks on wages is positive, ranging from an in-
crease of 0.42% for high-skilled workers’ wages to 0.66% for blue-collar workers’
wages after a rise of 10% in import penetration ratio and export share. For high-
skilled workers, the results imply an average exchange rate elasticity of -0.22: the
effect of a 1% currency appreciation on the hourly wage for a hypothetical high-
skilled worker employed in an industry with average import exposure is a 0.220%
wage expansion, potentially channeled through reductions in the cost of imported
intermediate inputs. Concerning blue-collar workers, the estimated elasticity of
hourly wage to exchange rate change is equal to 0.158. This means that the effect
of a 1% currency depreciation on the hourly wage for a hypothetical blue-collar
worker employed in an industry with average foreign exposure is a 0.158% wage
rise. These results, highlighting the asymmetric effect of exchange rates on wages
of workers of different skills or employed in different occupations, are in line with
the findings of Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003). One potential explanation is that a
currency appreciation puts pressure on costs which may push producers to invest
in processes that are substitutes to blue-collar/low-skilled workers and/or comple-
mentary to white-collar/high-skilled workers (e.g. Acemoglu, 1998).
Exchange rate effects are potentially heterogeneous across industries with dif-
ferent market structures (Nucci and Pozzolo; 2010, 2011). A number of papers
show that exchange rate pass-through elasticities depend on market structure and
in particular on the extent to which products are differentiated and the substitu-
tion among different variants (Yang, 1997). Thus, I present results exploring the
influence of market structure on shaping the response of wages to exchange rate
shocks. Preliminary evidence show that wages of workers employed in industries
that predominantly produce homogeneous goods are more responsive to exchange
rates movements than those working in industries that predominantly produce more
differentiated varieties.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and presents
the definition of the trade and exchange rates variables. Section 3.3 explains the
instrumental variable strategy to consistently estimate the causal impact of trade on
wages, while Section 3.4 presents the empirical specification. Section 3.5 presents
the main findings regarding the impact of trade on domestic wages, while Section
3.6 shows the impact of exchange rates on wages. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Data sources and variables description
3.2.1 Data sources
The data on workers, trade and exchange rates are drawn from several sources. At
the core is the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) conducted each year by the Fed-
eral Statistical Office (FSO). I have data for the period 1991-2008. The dataset pro-
vides extensive information about individual-level earnings, normal hours worked
per week, the industry and occupational status of each worker, and numerous socio-
economic characteristics. The SLFS uses industry description based on various re-
visions of the Swiss Economic Activity Nomenclature (NOGA85, 95, 02 and 08).4
The finest level of disaggregation I can consistently attain over the sample period
is the NOGA95 4-digit level, or equivalently the NACE Rev.1.0 4-digit level. The
occupation variable is based on the International Standard Classification of Oc-
cupations (ISCO-88). As outcome measure, I focus on individual-level (hourly)
wages. The wage is calculated as annual gross earnings, transformed in weekly
gross earnings, and then divided by total hours worked per week. In addition, I use
control variables such as age, sex, highest education attainment (5 classes), tenure
(continuous, in years), marital status, nationality (swiss or foreign), firm size (2
categories; with < 20 or ≥ 20 employees), location (26 cantons), occupation (225
groups) and industry (193 manufacturing). The sample is restricted to individuals
between 15 and 65 years old working in manufacturing industries.
Trade data are drawn from two distinct sources. Total swiss imports and ex-
ports data by industry are taken from the UN COMTRADE database at the 5-digit
SITC Rev.3 level (Standard International Trade Classification). I constructed a
concordance table to convert SITC Rev.3 products to NACE Rev.1.0 sectors at the
most detailed level (4-digit level).5 Expressed in current US dollar, the data are
converted to constant Swiss Franc (base = 2011).6 Bilateral trade flows for 193
countries, used to construct the gravity-type instruments and the industry-specific
effective exchange rates, are extracted from CEPII. The database is called BACI
and provides bilateral values of exports at the HS 6-digit product level, from 1995,
for more than 200 countries.7 Export values were then concorded from 6-digit
HS92 to 4-digit NACE Rev.1.0.8
In order to instrument for time-varying trade shocks at the industry level, I use
a structural gravity equation as a first-stage step to estimate the predicted values
of total export and import values. Details on the construction of the instruments
4The NOGA nomenclature is equivalent to the NACE nomenclature up to the 4-digit level of
disaggregation. NOGA95 corresponds to NACE Rev.1.0, NOGA02 corresponds to NACE Rev.1.1
and NOGA08 corresponds to NACE Rev.2.
5See the Appendix, section C.3 for details about how the concordance has been constructed.
6Swiss GDP deflator is used.
7See Gaulier and Zignago (2010) for details on the BACI database construction.
8Matching 6-digit HS92 products into SITC Rev.3 5-digit products is relatively straightforward
with the help of official concordance provided by the UN Statistical Office. Then, I used my own
SITC-NACE concordance as described in section C.3 in the Appendix.
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are described in section 3.3. For this task, I use the GeoDist database provided
by CEPII, which makes available the set of gravity variables developed in Mayer
and Zignago (2005). The dataset contains country-specific geographical variables
for 225 countries, including variables such as the geographical coordinates of their
capital cities, the language spoken in the country under different definitions and
a variable indicating whether the country is landlocked. The dataset also incor-
porates dyadic variables (valid for pairs of countries) such as bilateral distances,
whether pairs of countries were or are still part of the same country, whether coun-
tries are contiguous, and their colonial ties. Finally, I also make use of an additional
CEPII dataset called language that provides separate measures of common official
language, common spoken language, common native language and linguistic prox-
imity between different native languages, available for 195 countries.9
Other relevant data include gross production value per industry (GPV) obtained
from FSO. The data are only available at the 2-digit NACE level, so to construct
estimates of GPV at finer levels of disaggregation, I used total employment data by
4-digit industry. Industry employment data are not available for every year as they
come from a firm census which was conducted for 1995, 2001, 2005 and 2008.
As a consequence, in-between-year total industry employment are estimated by
linear interpolation. Then, I estimated 4-digit GPV by weighting 2-digit values
by the share of employment in each 4-digit sub-industries. Finally, swiss nominal
exchange rates with respect to its 28 most important trading partners were extracted
from the website fxtop.com, and then converted to real exchange rates using Swiss
and corresponding trading partners CPI (base year 2010).10
After merging data on workers, trade flows and industry-specific real effective
exchange rates (henceforth industry-specific REERs), I end up with a combined
dataset covering the sample period 1996-2008 which sample is described in table
C.1 in the Appendix.
3.2.2 Variable definitions
This paper explores the impact of globalization on wages of manufacturing workers
in the short run. I have four globalization variables that are industry-specific and
time-varying; import penetration ratio (IP), export share (XS), import-weighted
REER index, and export-weighted REER index.
Industry-specific import penetration ratio captures the industry exposure to im-
port competition. For worker i employed in industry k at time t, the ratio is calcu-
lated as follows:
IPk,t =
Mk,t
DAk,t
where DAk,t = Yk,t + Mk,t − Xk,t; (3.1)
9See Melitz and Toubal (2014) for details on the language database.
10The most important trading partners are Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg (treated as
one country), Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong-Kong, Hungary,
India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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where DAk,t denotes the apparent domestic absorption of industry k in year t, Yk,t
is gross production per industry k in year t, and Mk,t and Xk,t are respectively total
import and export values by industry k in year t.
Export share movements capture changes in comparative advantage for the ex-
porting country, whether arising from changes in production price, product quality
or variety. For worker i employed in industry k at time t, the export share, relative
to production, is calculated as follows:
XSk,t =
Xk,t
Yk,t
. (3.2)
The industry-specific REER movements can be considered as shocks either to
the delivered price of foreign goods or to the offered price of (domestic) outputs
sold abroad. Thus, constructing two different measures of industry-specific REER,
one reflecting the geographic composition of each industry’s main import competi-
tors and one capturing the composition of each industry’s main export markets,
allows to separately estimate shocks to input and output prices respectively. In-
deed, industries can be substantially different in their mix of trading partners such
that swings in a specific bilateral exchange rate lead to an asymmetric effect on
workers.
The industry-specific REERs are constructed by weighting movements in the
real exchange rate of the most important trading partners of Switzerland. The
import-weighted REER is constructed as a weighted geometric 3-year-moving-
average as follows:
ERMk,t = exp
[∏
c
θc,k,t−1 × ln(RER)c,t
]
, (3.3)
where θc,k,t−1 =
t−3∑
i=t−1
Mc,k,i
t−3∑
i=t−1
∑
c
Mc,k,i
. (3.4)
RERc,t denotes the Swiss bilateral real exchange rate index with country c in year
t. In a similar fashion, the export-weighted REER is constructed as:
ERXk,t = exp
[∏
c
ηc,k,t−1 × ln(RER)c,t
]
, (3.5)
where ηc,k,t−1 =
t−3∑
i=t−1
Xc,k,i
t−3∑
i=t−1
∑
c
Xc,k,i
. (3.6)
The weights are lagged by one year in order to mitigate the potential correlation
between exchange rate fluctuations and the geographic composition of trade flows.
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3.3 Instrumental variable strategy
Exogenous globalization shocks likely coincide with endogenous changes in do-
mestic production and consumption that in turn affect trade patterns and labor-
market conditions. On the one hand, the industry-specific REER movements can
be considered as exogenous shocks either to the delivered price of foreign goods or
to the offered price of domestic outputs sold abroad. I assume that, in the case of
Switzerland, swings in exchange rates can arguably be taken as exogenous shocks
to domestic workers as movements in the swiss currency are mainly due to external
forces external to the swiss domestic market.11 On the other hand, unlike exchange
rates, the estimated impact of trade may be potentially contaminated by domestic
demand shocks to the Swiss economy that might influence import demand and
export opportunities. Part of the observed fluctuations in trade might be due to
changes in the domestic labor market that have nothing to do with factors driv-
ing foreign competition. If changes in trade flows partly reflect domestic shocks
to Swiss industries, then this reverse causality would undermine the interpretation
of the results. Another potential threats that might invalidate our estimates is the
probable correlation between technological change and trade shocks. One usual
suspect is automation; for example if the wage of low-skilled workers are dispro-
portionately affected by automation and, at the same time, those workers suffer
relatively more, say, from import competition, then it would cast doubts on the
causal interpretation of the results and bias the OLS estimation towards zero.
I attempt to address these issues in several manners. First, I hope to neutral-
ized reverse causality and mitigate skill-biased technological change (SBTC) by
linking industry-level trade and exchange rate variables with individual-level data
on wages and detailed socio-demographic characteristics. Indeed, a worker may
hardly influence industry-level outcomes. Second, controlling for industry charac-
teristics such as the annual industry average wage, controlling for the occupation
of each worker at a detailed level and also for individual education attainment is a
further attempt to mitigate coefficient biases. Third, I control for 4-digit industry
and 2-digit sector × time fixed effects. I therefore compare workers within 4-digit
industries controlling for 2-digit time-varying sectoral shocks in order to mitigate
the effect of technological change. Finally, I use a gravity-type estimation strat-
egy as a first-stage step to construct instrumental variables designed to consistently
estimate the causal effect of trade on manufacturing workers.
This gravity methodology consists of aggregating up across a country’s part-
ners the prediction of a regression that aims to estimate trade flows with distance,
language, land-border, colonial ties, landlocked status, and industry-level direc-
tional (origin and destination) fixed-effects. Gravity estimates are valid instruments
since they are based on geographical and cultural variables which are plausibly ex-
ogenous (at least in the short term) and yet, when aggregated across all bilateral
trading partners, correlated with a country’s overall trade patterns. However, in-
11The same plausible assumption is made in Kaiser and Siegenthaler (2014).
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stead of using predicted trade flows for Switzerland with respect to all its trading
partners, I use average values of estimated trade flows from third countries to con-
struct instruments for trade flows of Swiss industries.12 The underlying hypothesis
is that the estimated trade flows from third countries are correlated with the actual
Swiss flows through geography and cultural characteristics, which are less likely
to be related to economic outcomes through any channel other than trade.
The structural gravity model used is based on Anderson (1979) and follows
from the model at the industry level as in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004). The
detailed derivation of the structural gravity model can be found in section C.2 of
the Appendix. In short, the structural model is derived under the assumptions of
a CES demand specification with product differentiation by place of origin (ı.e.
Armington type). Further assumptions are the inclusion of budget constraints (one
for each destination in each industry) and market clearance equations (one for each
origin in each industry). I abstract from the time subscript t to ease notation. At
the industry level, the resulting model is:
To,d,k =
Ed,kYo,k
Yk
(
to,d,k
Πo,kPd,k
)1−σk
(3.7)
(Πo,k)
1−σk =
∑
d
(
to,d,k
Pd,k
)1−σk Ed,k
Yk
(3.8)
(Pd,k)
1−σk =
∑
o
(
to,d,k
Πo,k
)1−σk Yo,k
Yk
, (3.9)
where To,d,k is the value of shipments at destination prices from origin o to desti-
nation d in industry k. Ed,k denotes the expenditure at destination d on goods in
industry k from all origins. Yo,k represents sales of goods at destination prices from
origin o in industry k to all destinations, whereas Yk is the total output of goods
in industry k at delivered prices. to,d,k ≥ 1 is the variable trade cost on shipment
of goods from origin o to destination d in industry k. σk represents the elastic-
ity of substitution across goods in industry k. The term Πo,k represents outward
multilateral resistance, which captures the average sellers’ ”frictions” faced in all
destination countries. Finally, Pd,k represents inward multilateral resistance (and
is also the CES sectoral price index for the demand system), which then measures
the average buyers’ ”frictions” faced in all origin markets.13
Turning to the estimation of the fundamental structural gravity equation in
(3.7), and following the standard practice in the gravity literature, bilateral trade
costs to,d,k are approximated by a set of observable proxy variables. For each in-
12I use 9 non-European OECD countries’ bilateral trade statistics with 193 countries (excluding
Switzerland) for the estimation of the gravity regression. The 9 countries are Australia, Canada,
Chile, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New-Zealand and the US (incl. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico).
The results are robust to using alternative sets of countries.
13See Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003).
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dustry k, the specification is of the form:
(tko,d)
1−σk = exp[γk1 ln DISTo,d + γ
k
2BRDRo,d + γ
k
3CLNYo,d
+γk4CLNY 45o,d + γ
k
5SMCTRYo,d + γ
k
6COLo,d
+γk7CSLo,d + γ
k
8CNLo,d + γ
k
9LPo,d] (3.10)
where ln DISTo,d is the logarithm of bilateral distance between origin country o
and destination country d. BRDRo,d captures the presence of contiguous borders.
CLNYo,d and CLNY 45o,d accounts whether pairs have ever been or have been
post 1945 in a colonial relationship respectively. SMCTRYo,d is a variable equal
to 1 if pairs were or still are the same country. COLo,d, CSLo,d and CNLo,d
stands for common official, spoken and national language respectively. Finally,
LPo,d is a variable representing language proximity between different native lan-
guages for pair of countries. As documented by Melitz and Toubal (2014), the use
of common official language alone underestimate the impact of language and fails
to capture the fact that the primary source of linguistic influence on bilateral trade
is information rather than ethnicity or trust.
The next step toward estimation is to use (3.10) to substitute for the power
transform of bilateral trade costs in (3.7) and add origin-time and destination-
time fixed effects for each industry k. The Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood
(PPML) estimator of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) is used in order to to address
the issues of heteroskedasticity and zeros in bilateral trade flows.14 The PPML
technique is used to estimate the following econometric specification of the gravity
model for each industry k (220 manufacturing industries):
T ko,d,t = exp[γ
k
0 + γ
k
1 ln DISTo,d + γ
k
2BRDRo,d + γ
k
3CLNYo,d
+γk4CLNY 45o,d + γ
k
5SMCTRYo,d + γ
k
6COLo,d
+γk7CSLo,d + γ
k
8CNLo,d + γ
k
9LPo,d + α
k
o,t + ω
k
d,t] + 
k
o,d,t (3.11)
where αko,t represents the set of time-varying origin-country industry-specific fixed
effects which controls for the outward multilateral resistances Πo,k,t along with
total sale Yo,k,t. Finally, ωkd,t denotes the set of time-varying destination-country
industry-specific fixed effects that controls for the inward multilateral resistances
Pd,k,t along with total expenditures Ed,k,t.15
For the purpose of illustration, Table 3.1 provides gravity coefficients, esti-
mated by (3.11), by broad sector for years 1995-2008. I have to remind that the
sourcing (origin) countries are the 9 non-European OECD countries 16, whereas
the trading (destination) partners include 193 countries (excluding Switzerland)
for which I have complete and consistent gravity and trade data.
14Results are robust with or without zero trade flows included and with alternative estimator such
as OLS.
15See the work of Anderson and Yotov (2010, 2010 and 2012) for similar developments.
16To remind the reader, the countries are Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
New-Zealand and the US (incl. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico).
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Without going too much into details, let me briefly summarize the most salient
features of the PPML gravity estimates reported in table 3.1. The coefficient on
distance is always negative and statistically significant except for Transport.17 Dis-
tance is hence a major obstacle to trade, but its magnitude displays significant vari-
ability across sectors, with low value/weight ratio sectors, such as Fuels and Wood,
potentially more impacted than sectors with higher value/weight ratio. Contiguity
also matters for most sectors. Having a common border significantly boosts trade
flows in 9 out of 14 sectors.18 Surprisingly, post-1945 colonial ties have a depress-
ing effect on trade for almost all sectors except Food as shown by the coefficients on
CLNY45. On the other hand, the sign of the coefficients on CLNY, whether coun-
tries have ever been in a colonial relationship, are not stable across sectors and
have varying degrees of statistical significance. Finally, the impact of language,
and the relative contributions of the different sources of linguistic influence, vary
widely across sectors. On the one hand, having a common spoken language, which
intends to capture the ease of communication, seems to facilitate trade as the only
significant coefficients have a positive sign. On the other hand, estimates show
that countries sharing common national languages tend to trade less in 7 out of 17
sectors. Surprisingly, and maybe driven by the 9 countries selected in the sample,
greater linguistic proximity is not always a guarantee towards larger trade flows.
17One explanation for the non-significance of distance could come from the fact that trade in
the Transport sector are disproportionately arising between neighboring countries, and especially
between Canada, Mexico and the US, as suggested by the large positive and significant coefficient
estimates on the contiguity variable, BRDR, and on the language proximity variable LP.
18As mentioned in the previous footnote, the effect of BRDR may be potentially driven by Canada,
Mexico and the US.
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Table 3.1: PPML gravity estimations for export values by broad sector, 1995-2008
Food Textile Leath./Shoes Wood Paper/Print/Publ. Fuels Chemicals
LNDIST -0.823*** -1.338*** -1.092*** -1.665*** -1.004*** -1.898*** -1.067***
(0.089) (0.146) (0.139) (0.156) (0.184) (0.131) (0.077)
BRDR 0.865*** 0.821** 0.742* 0.345 0.915*** 0.153 0.118
(0.207) (0.359) (0.429) (0.293) (0.353) (0.327) (0.170)
CLNY -0.328 -0.270 -0.112 0.781* 0.129 0.713 -0.074
(0.283) (0.265) (0.272) (0.450) (0.189) (0.489) (0.146)
CLNY45 0.099 -1.159* -0.880** -2.388*** -1.522*** -3.231*** -1.395***
(0.320) (0.647) (0.351) (0.794) (0.411) (0.645) (0.298)
SMCTRY -0.226 0.774 0.182 0.182 0.439 0.650 0.513*
(0.288) (0.796) (0.779) (0.731) (0.374) (0.468) (0.306)
COL -0.240 0.887** 0.439 -1.123** -0.153 -0.032 -0.048
(0.268) (0.351) (0.473) (0.479) (0.280) (0.406) (0.221)
CSL 0.660 -0.760 0.584 2.082*** 0.469 1.848** 2.117***
(0.464) (0.723) (0.848) (0.751) (0.618) (0.777) (0.409)
CNL -0.455 -1.041 -1.816** -0.741 -0.098 -2.829*** -1.648***
(0.680) (0.924) (0.815) (0.878) (0.805) (0.991) (0.506)
LP -0.338** -0.049 -0.221 -0.670*** -0.180 -0.380 -0.331***
(0.137) (0.202) (0.158) (0.229) (0.230) (0.295) (0.121)
Constant 9.535*** 11.498*** 8.503*** 13.684*** 7.341*** 17.937*** 8.325***
(0.859) (1.379) (1.220) (1.447) (1.968) (1.224) (0.793)
R-squared 0.937 0.941 0.888 0.980 0.986 0.918 0.963
Observations 23338 23338 23338 23338 23338 23338 23338
Rub./Plast. Minerals Metals Machinery Electric Transport Miscell.
LNDIST -1.063*** -1.295*** -0.912*** -0.991*** -0.856*** -0.075 -1.266***
(0.105) (0.147) (0.116) (0.073) (0.102) (0.188) (0.181)
BRDR 1.135*** 0.523* 1.259*** 0.351** 0.408 2.493*** 0.093
(0.198) (0.278) (0.227) (0.162) (0.330) (0.493) (0.590)
CLNY -0.323* -0.139 0.688** -0.243** -0.101 0.729*** -0.119
(0.165) (0.140) (0.291) (0.109) (0.108) (0.188) (0.258)
CLNY45 -0.772* -1.311*** -1.810*** -0.938*** -1.062*** -2.166*** -1.799***
(0.414) (0.408) (0.384) (0.225) (0.256) (0.411) (0.309)
SMCTRY 0.492* 1.074** -1.975*** 0.553 -2.063*** -0.992 0.928
(0.258) (0.478) (0.412) (0.914) (0.710) (1.055) (0.787)
COL 0.169 0.200 0.510** 0.247* 0.180 0.489** 1.990***
(0.150) (0.202) (0.258) (0.149) (0.147) (0.218) (0.345)
CSL 1.345*** 0.764** -0.580 0.279 0.235 -0.241 -0.979
(0.294) (0.386) (0.534) (0.275) (0.341) (0.500) (0.767)
CNL -1.464*** -0.499 0.479 -0.620* -0.528* 0.053 -1.632**
(0.448) (0.596) (0.635) (0.357) (0.294) (0.620) (0.745)
LP -0.400*** -0.214** 0.292** -0.269*** -0.171** 0.400*** -0.113
(0.094) (0.104) (0.143) (0.074) (0.079) (0.142) (0.187)
Constant 6.872*** 9.400*** 9.162*** 8.867*** 6.518*** -0.496 11.518***
(1.108) (1.411) (1.336) (0.768) (1.049) (1.922) (1.710)
R-squared 0.978 0.972 0.950 0.958 0.919 0.965 0.945
Observations 23338 23338 23338 23338 23338 23338 23338
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country pair) are reported in parentheses. Each estimation is performed with directional (source
and destination) and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is always the value of exports. *p≤0.10, **p≤0.05, ***p≤0.01.
Sources: Own estimations based on the BACII database.
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Let me turn back to the construction of the instrumental variables. I obtain the
bilateral predicted export values from (3.11), T̂ ko,d,t for each industry k and period
t. Then, I sum them over destination (origin) countries to get an estimate of exports
for each origin (imports for each destination) for each industry k. Finally, I take
the average values over origin or destination countries to get the estimated total
exports, X̂k,t, and total imports, M̂k,t for each sector k in each year t respectively.
To be precise:
X̂k,t =
1
no
∑
o
(∑
d
T̂o,d,k,t
)
, (3.12)
M̂k,t =
1
nd
∑
d
(∑
o
T̂o,d,k,t
)
, (3.13)
where nd and no denote the number of destination and origin countries respectively.
X̂k,t is then used as the instrument for total swiss exports in industry k and year
t, whereas M̂k,t is used as the instrument for total swiss imports in industry k
and year t. The instrumental variables are therefore constructed in the following
manner:
IPIVk,t =
M̂k,t
DAk,t
(3.14)
XSIVk,t =
X̂k,t
Yk,t
. (3.15)
3.4 Empirical strategy: 2nd stage equation
The empirical strategy is to regress worker i-level wage, in industry k in period t on
lagged measures of trade and weighted REER indexes using annual data from 1996
to 2008. I present two different equation specifications. The first one estimates the
direct impact of trade inspired from studies such as Ebenstein et al. (2014), while
the second one estimates the impact of exchange rates movements in a similar
fashion than Campa and Goldberg (2001) or Nucci and Pozzolo (2010, 2014). The
first specification, estimated either with ordinary least squares (OLS) or two-stage
least squares (2SLS), is of the form:
wi,k,t =β0 + T′k,t−1β1 + X
′
i,k,tβ2 + Z
′
k,τβ3
+β4Dt + β5Ik + β6Oj + β7DIl,t + εi,k,t. (3.16)
The dependent variables wi,k,t, for individual i working in industry k in year
t, is the log of real hourly wage. Tk,t−1 is a vector containing the trade variables
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and is given by:
Tk,t−1 =
[
ln(IP)k,t−1
ln(XS)k,t−1
]
; (3.17)
where ln(IP)k,t−1 is the value of the log of import penetration ratio in industry k
in year t− 1 as defined by (3.1) in section 3.2.2. It captures the industry exposure
to import competition. In the IV specifications, ln(IP)k,t−1 is instrumented by the
import penetration ratio constructed with the gravity-predicted imports in (3.14)
from third countries as illustrated in section 3.3.
ln(XS)k,t−1 is the value of the log of export share in industry k in year t −
1 as defined by (3.2) in section 3.2.2. It intends to capture the export exposure
of each industry relative to production. In the IV specifications, ln(XS)k,t−1 is
instrumented by the export share constructed with the gravity-predicted exports in
(3.15) from third countries as illustrated in section 3.3.
Xi,k,t is a vector of individual characteristics including age, age squared, age
cubed, sex, marital status, whether the worker is swiss, tenure in the establishment
(continuous, in years), highest education attainment (5 classes), firm size (2 cate-
gories; with < 20 or ≥ 20 employee) and location (26 cantons). Trade variables
are lagged one period in order to mitigate the problem of reverse causality and also
because wage adjustments are not likely to be instantaneous.
Zk,τ is a vector of industry characteristics comprising the industry k average
hourly wage in years t, t − 1 and t − 2. Finally, Dt represents time fixed effects
(13 years), Ik represents 4-digit industry fixed effects (193 manufacturing), Oj
represents 4-digit occupation fixed effects (225 groups) and finallyDIl,t represents
2-digit sector × time fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 4-
digit industry level.
The second specification looks at the effect of exchange rates movements on
wages. As in Campa and Goldberg (2001) or Nucci and Pozzolo (2010, 2014), I
test whether wage adjustments after an exchange rate shock are stronger depending
on the external orientation of each industry. It is expected that an appreciation of
the domestic currency would impact workers more, through revenues, the higher is
the industry’s exposure to sales from exports. On the contrary, on the cost side, an
appreciation of the domestic currency may induce a cut in imported input expendi-
tures and the effect is supposed to be larger the higher is the industry exposure to
import competition.19 Therefore, I include both changes in industry-specific REER
indexes as well as the interactions between import penetration ratio, in year t− 1,
and the change in import-weighted REER index on the one hand, and between ex-
port share, in year t − 1, and the change in export-weighted REER index on the
other hand. In light of the non-stationarity of the exchange rate time series, the
19One would suggest for example to use the industry’s share of cost stemming from imported
intermediate inputs instead. Unfortunately, I lack such data. However, an OECD study ranked
Switzerland 16th in Global Value Chain participation amongst OECD and BRICS economies in 2009.
It suggests that the share of imported intermediate inputs in total imports is potentially significant
among manufacturing industries.
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specification is estimated in first differences.
It has to be noted that estimating in first-differences result in a loss of obser-
vations. Indeed, even though the SLFS dataset includes information for workers
observed over consecutive years (up to five years), a little less than 40% of individ-
uals drop out of the sample after one year. The first-difference specification is of
the form:
∆wi,k,t =γ0 + G′k,t−1γ1 + ∆P
′
k,tγ2 + ∆GP
′
k,τγ3 + X
′
i,k,tγ4 + ∆Z
′
k,tγ5
+γ6Dt + γ7Ik + γ8Oj + γ9DIl,t + εi,k,t (3.18)
where Gk,t−1 is a vector containing the industry import penetration ratio and ex-
port share in period t− 1 as follows:
Gk,t−1 =
[
IPk,t−1
XSk,t−1
]
. (3.19)
∆Pk,t−1 is a vector containing the two different industry-specific REER in-
dexes and is as follows:
∆Pk,t =
[
∆ERMk,t
∆ERXk,t
]
, (3.20)
where ∆ERMk,t is the log change, between t and t − 1, in the import-weighted
industry-specific REER index as defined by (3.3) in section 3.2.2. A higher rate
means a real depreciation of the swiss currency relative to the industry-specific
foreign basket. Finally, ∆ERXk,t is the log change in the export-weighted industry-
specific REER index as defined by (3.5) in section 3.2.2.
∆GPk,τ is a vector containing the interaction between the trade variables and
the change in industry-specific REER indexes as follows:
∆GPk,τ =
[
IPk,t−1 ×∆ERMk,t
XSk,t−1 ×∆ERXk,t
]
. (3.21)
Finally, ∆Zk,t includes the change in industry average (log) wage and the
change in individual (log) annual hours of work. As in equation (3.16), I also
include the full vector of individual characteristics, as well as time, region, indus-
try, occupation and time × 2-digit sector fixed-effects. Therefore, the estimating
equations as specified in (3.16) and (3.18) capture the short term effect of trade
and exchange rates shocks on wages for workers (i) sharing similar characteristics
in terms of age, sex, education, nationality, location and marital status; (ii) having
the same experience on the job, within similar occupation ; (iii) with similar av-
erage industry characteristics; and (iv) being employed in different sub-industries
of the same sector. An important point to note is that I am only able to capture
the wage effect for workers that remain employed in the manufacturing sector. I
am therefore unable to gauge the wage consequence for workers switching out of
manufacturing, or for those that become unemployed.
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3.5 The effect of trade on wages
The OLS and 2SLS estimates of wage determinants of equation (3.16) for all work-
ers are shown in Table 3.2. Columns 1 to 5 present various estimations performed
with OLS. In column 1, I perform the estimation without control variables and in-
cluding only time and industry fixed effects. The effect of import penetration on
wage is consistently and significantly negative, with a coefficient of -0.054 sug-
gesting a small impact on wage; a 10% increase in industry exposure from import
competition is associated with a 0.54% decline in wage. The impact of export share
is positive and significant with a point estimate of 0.062; a 10% increase in export
share is associated with a 0.62% increase in wage. Therefore, in net, the effect of
trade shocks on wage is small but significantly positive.
The subsequent columns present the estimation with additional controls and
fixed effects. In column 2, I add region and education fixed-effects. Column 3
adds the full set of control variables. Finally, columns 4 and 5 add sector × year
fixed effects and occupation fixed effects respectively. The coefficients are re-
markably stable, yet with lower coefficients on both import penetration and export
share, across the five specifications. The last column is the equivalent of column
5 but estimated using 2SLS, in which import penetration ratio and export share
are instrumented by (3.14) and (3.15) respectively. This is the preferred specifi-
cation. The coefficient on the import penetration is unchanged relative to the one
estimated using OLS. On the contrary, the coefficient on the export share is roughly
40% larger. This is consistent with there being a positive correlation between in-
dustry trade shocks and industry characteristics that seems to slightly bias OLS
estimates towards zero. In column 6, point estimates suggest that a 10% increase
in import penetration leads to a drop of 0.39% in wages, while a 10% increase
in the export share implies a 0.53% increase in wages; the net effect is therefore
positive but modest. Overall, these results contrast with those in Ebenstein et al.
(2014). Indeed contrasting industry and occupation exposure to trade, they do not
find any impact of increased industry trade exposure on wages.
Concerning individual-level characteristics, Table 3.2 presents results that are
fairly expected. Wages are higher for males, for married and older workers, for
workers with higher tenure at the firm and for those working in larger firms. More-
over, the contemporaneous average industry wage is positively related with indi-
vidual wage, whereas the two corresponding lagged measures do not seem to sig-
nificantly influence workers’ wages. Finally, the number of annual hours of work
is negatively related to wage.20
The instruments perform well overall. The F-stat on the excluded instruments
is equal to 36.3, which indicates that the 2SLS estimation does not suffer from
a weak-instrument issue.21 Most reassuringly, the first-stage regressions in Ta-
20Controlling for the number of annual hours worked means that if I estimate equation (3.16) using
the log of annual gross earnings instead of wages, results are equivalent.
21The F-stat on the excluded instruments is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat, which is a Wald test for
weak-identification.
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ble C.2, columns 1 and 2, in the Appendix, confirm that the instruments behave
in the expected way: third countries’ trade flows estimated with the gravity pro-
cedure are positively and significantly related to swiss trade flows. Therefore, the
instrumental variables are good predictors of the endogenous variables.
When averaged across all workers, the overall impact of trade on wages ap-
pears small, as shown in Table 3.2. However, for some specific group of workers,
the effect can be larger. Table 3.3 presents the OLS and corresponding 2SLS re-
gressions, as in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.2, separately for different groups of
workers. Panel A presents estimations of equation (3.16) separating workers based
on their highest education attainment; high-skilled workers in columns 1 and 2,
and low-skilled workers in columns 3 and 4.22 Panel B shows the corresponding
estimations based on the worker’s occupation.23 Results for white collar workers
are presented in columns 1 and 2, while results for blue collar workers can be found
in columns 3 and 4. 24
What emerges from Panel A of Table 3.3 is that the impact of import penetra-
tion ratios and export shares are concentrated among high-skilled workers almost
exclusively. Indeed, as suggested by the point estimates, import penetration and
export shares have a larger impact on wages for high-skilled workers relative to
low-skilled workers. For the former group, the coefficients in column 2 indicates
that a 10% increase in industry exposure to import competition is associated with
a 0.75% decline in wages. In contrast, a 10% increase in export share is related
to a 1.16% increase in wages. Columns 3 and 4 shows lower point estimates for
both trade shocks when low-skilled workers are considered, yet they are not signif-
icantly different from zero in the IV specification.25
Turning to Panel B of Table 3.3, workers employed in blue-collar occupations
see their wages respond more to trade shocks than workers employed in white-
collar occupations. The results in column 4 indicate that a 10% increase in import
penetration ration leads to a drop of 0.89% in wages. On the contrary, a 10%
increase in industry exposure from exports is associated with a 1.5% increase in
wages.26 Overall, the net effect of trade shocks on wages is positive, ranging
from an increase of 0.42% for high-skilled workers’ wages to 0.66% for blue-collar
workers’ wages after a rise of 10% in import penetration ratio and export share.
22High-skilled workers are those that have either graduated from a university, from a professional
school, or have a Maturite´. The low-skilled workers corresponds to those that have finished an
apprenticeship or less.
23The occupation classification is ISCO-88.
24White-collar workers are those in occupations such as legislators, senior officials and managers,
professionals, technicians and associate professionals, clerks, service workers, and shop and market
sales. Blue-collar workers are those in occupations such as skill agricultural and fishery workers, and
craft and related workers, plant and machine operators, assemblers and elementary occupations.
25The corresponding first-stage regressions of column 2, for high-skilled workers, can be found in
columns 3 and 4 in Table C.2 in the Appendix, whereas the corresponding first-stage estimates for
low-skilled workers can be found in columns 5 and 6.
26Again, the corresponding first-stage regressions of column 2, for white-collar workers, can be
found in columns 7 and 8 in Table C.2 in the Appendix, whereas the corresponding first-stage esti-
mates for blue-collar workers can be found in columns 9 and 10.
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Table 3.2: OLS and 2SLS estimates of wage determinants (1996-2008): overall
workers
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(IP)k,t−1 -0.054*** -0.045** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
ln(XS)k,t−1 0.062** 0.048** 0.045** 0.044** 0.038** 0.053**
(0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023)
wk,t 0.398*** 0.397*** 0.351*** 0.350***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033)
wk,t−1 0.007 0.013 -0.002 -0.002
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
wk,t−2 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.013
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
ln(hours)t -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.103*** -0.103***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Age 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.075***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age2 (× 1000) -1.387*** -1.387*** -1.392*** -1.393***
(0.282) (0.282) (0.276) (0.277)
Age3 (× 1000) 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Married 0.011 0.011 0.018*** 0.018**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Foreign -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.009 -0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Female -0.199*** -0.200*** -0.233*** -0.233***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Tenure 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Size 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.086*** 0.086***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector×Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation FE No No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.163 0.163 0.168 0.168
F 4.198 3.642 157.471 164.979 208.670 194.700
N 22,633 22,633 22,633 22,633 22,633 22,633
No. Clusters 193 193 193 193 193 193
F-test on IVs 36.259
Notes: The dependent variables in all columns is the log of hourly wage. All regressions include
a constant term. Standard errors are clustered at the industry 4-digit level. Columns (1) to (5) are
estimated with OLS, while column (6) is estimated using 2SLS. Column (1) controls for year
and industry 4-digit fixed effects. Columns (2) and (3) add regional and education fixed effects.
Column (4) adds 2-digit sector× year fixed effects. Columns (5) and (6) add occupation 4-digit
fixed effects. The F-stat on the excluded instruments is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat, which is a
Wald test for weak-identification. * p≤0.10, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤ 0.01.
Sources: Own estimations based on merged BACII-SLFS database.
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Table 3.3: OLS and 2SLS estimates of wage determinants: various groups of work-
ers
Panel A: education High-skilled Low-skilled
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(IP)k,t−1 -0.056*** -0.074*** -0.033* -0.017
(0.019) (0.026) (0.018) (0.019)
ln(XS)k,t−1 0.050** 0.116*** 0.048** 0.036
(0.023) (0.038) (0.022) (0.034)
wk,t 0.369*** 0.361*** 0.332*** 0.333***
(0.052) (0.051) (0.040) (0.040)
wk,t−1 0.071* 0.075* -0.042 -0.041
(0.040) (0.040) (0.029) (0.030)
wk,t−2 -0.023 -0.016 -0.019 -0.017
(0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
ln(hours)t -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.095*** -0.095***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029)
R-squared 0.194 0.193 0.159 0.159
F 66.543 65.634 118.677 110.707
N 7,979 7,979 14,654 14,654
No. Clusters 173 173 186 186
F-test on excluded IVs 34.794 27.257
Panel B: occupation White-collar Blue-collar
ln(IP)k,t−1 -0.029** -0.020 -0.049* -0.086*
(0.012) (0.017) (0.030) (0.051)
ln(XS)k,t−1 -0.001 -0.005 0.091*** 0.152**
(0.022) (0.037) (0.034) (0.063)
wk,t 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.345*** 0.343***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.060) (0.059)
wk,t−1 0.005 0.005 -0.014 -0.016
(0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.037)
wk,t−2 0.012 0.013 -0.060* -0.062*
(0.022) (0.023) (0.033) (0.033)
ln(hours)t -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.091*** -0.092***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032)
R-squared 0.221 0.221 0.130 0.129
F 147.852 144.324 74.148 66.520
N 11,864 11,864 10,761 10,761
No. Clusters 181 181 182 182
F-test on excluded IVs 41.624 14.933
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the log of hourly wage. All regressions
include a constant term and all control variables that are included in Table 3.2 (not shown,
but available on request). Standard errors are clustered at the industry 4-digit level. All
regressions control for regional, year, education, industry 4-digit level, occupation 4-digit
level and 2-digit industry× year fixed effects. Panel A shows results for workers according
to their highest education attainment. Columns (1) and (2) present results for high-skilled
workers, while columns (3) and (4) show results for low-skilled workers. Panel B shows
results for workers according to their occupation. Columns (1) and (2) present results for
white-collar workers, while columns (3) and (4) show results for blue-collar workers. The
F-stat on the excluded instruments is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat. * p≤0.10, ** p≤0.05, ***
p≤ 0.01.
Sources: Own estimations based on merged BACII-SLFS database.
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3.6 The effect of exchange rates on wages
As in Campa and Goldberg (2001) and Nucci and Pozzolo (2010, 2014), in this
section, I test whether individual-level wage adjustments after an exchange rate
shock are stronger depending on the external orientation of each industry and the
geographic composition of each industry’s trading partners. It is expected that an
appreciation of the domestic currency would impact workers more, through rev-
enues, the higher is the industry’s share of exports. On the contrary, on the cost
side, an appreciation of the domestic currency may induce a cut in foreign imported
intermediate input expenditures and the effect is potentially larger the higher is the
industry exposure to import competition. Accordingly, Table 3.4 presents the OLS
estimates of the impact of exchange rate movement on wages using equation (3.18)
over the period 1996-2008. Column 1 reports estimates of equation (3.18) includ-
ing all workers. Columns 2 and 3 shows results for high-skilled and low-skilled
workers respectively. Finally, columns 4 and 5 present the corresponding results
for white-collar and blue-collar workers respectively.
The results in the first column shows a limited role of exchange rate move-
ments in explaining changes in real wages when all workers are considered. How-
ever, when the sample is split by highest education attainment, we can see that
exchange rates movements affect high-skilled workers only (column 2). This is
further evidence that the wages of high-skilled workers are more responsive to
trade and exchange rate shocks than workers with lower education attainments.
One potential reason is that high-skilled workers are more likely to be employed
in trade-oriented firms than low-skilled workers, leading to increased exposure of
high-skilled workers to exchange rate shocks.
The results in column 2 suggest that wages of high-skilled workers are af-
fected by the change in the import-weighted REER, as suggested by the statis-
tically significant coefficient on the interaction between the change in industry’s
import-weighted REER and the lagged import penetration ratio. The correspond-
ing coefficient implies an import-weighted exchange rate elasticity of -0.22 for
a hypothetical worker employed in an industry with average exposure to import
competition (ı.e. IP k,t = 0.791). This means that a 1% appreciation of the import-
weighted REER index increase high-skilled wages by 0.220%, potentially chan-
neled through reductions in the cost of imported intermediate inputs. In column 5,
we can see that blue-collar workers seem also affected by swings in exchange rates.
Now, both interaction terms turn significantly different from zero. For a worker
employed in an industry with average export share and facing average exposure
from import competition, the estimated elasticity of hourly wage to exchange rate
change is 0.158. This means that the effect of a 1% currency depreciation on the
hourly wage for a hypothetical blue-collar worker employed in an industry with
this type of foreign exposure is a 0.158% wage expansion. This result is in line
with some findings in the literature where depreciation are sometimes associated
with small but significant increase in industry wage (e.g. Revenga, 1992).
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Table 3.4: OLS estimates of exchange rate movements on wages for workers of
different groups (1996-2008)
Overall High-skilled Low-skilled White-collar Blue-collar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IPk,t−1 ×∆ERMk,t 0.001 0.015*** 0.137 0.000 0.981***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.097) (0.004) (0.337)
XSk,t−1 ×∆ERXk,t 0.073 0.070 -0.034 0.158 -0.396*
(0.128) (0.278) (0.126) (0.230) (0.208)
IPk,t−1 (× 1000) -0.002 0.316*** 2.728 -0.045 2.401
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004)
XSk,t−1 0.018 -0.033** 0.020 0.027 -0.001
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
∆ERMk,t -0.512 -0.232 -0.640 -0.644 -0.427
(0.394) (0.314) (0.444) (0.405) (0.656)
∆ERXk,t -0.030 0.082 -0.045 -0.080 0.026
(0.041) (0.063) (0.063) (0.094) (0.045)
∆wk,t 0.148*** 0.176*** 0.135*** 0.165*** 0.117*
(0.033) (0.054) (0.045) (0.041) (0.065)
∆hourst -0.537*** -0.413*** -0.601*** -0.475*** -0.644***
(0.052) (0.061) (0.062) (0.076) (0.071)
Age (× 1000) -0.201*** -0.117*** -0.220*** -0.201*** -0.192***
(0.020) (0.028) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029)
Age2 (× 1000) 4.533*** 2.588*** 4.983*** 4.536*** 4.351***
(0.462) (0.669) (0.518) (0.562) (0.679)
Age3 (× 1000) -0.033*** -0.019*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.032***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Married 0.006 -0.011 0.013 -0.006 0.024*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014)
Foreign 0.010 0.018 0.006 0.011 0.006
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
Female 0.003 -0.022 0.012 -0.007 0.010
(0.008) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
Tenure -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Firm Size 0.001 -0.005 0.013 -0.008 0.005
(0.010) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.182 0.115 0.218 0.189 0.174
F 27.246 17.974 23.303 11.929 15.885
N 14,367 5,073 9,294 769 667
No. Clusters 194 169 187 185 178
Notes: The dependent variables in all columns is the growth rate of hourly wage. All regres-
sions include a constant term. Standard errors are clustered at the industry 4-digit level. All
regressions control for regional, year, education, industry 4-digit level, occupation 4-digit level
and 2-digit industry×year fixed effects. * p≤0.10, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤ 0.01.
Sources: Own estimations based on merged BACII-SLFS database.
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The asymmetric effect of exchange rates on wages of workers of different skills
or employed in different occupations, are in line with the findings of Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2003). In their paper, they also find that a currency depreciation boosts
wages for blue collar workers, but lowers wages of white collar workers (some-
thing I do not find for white-collar workers, but for high-skilled workers). One
potential explanation is that a currency appreciation puts pressure on costs which
may push producers to invest in processes that are substitutes to blue-collar/low-
skilled workers and/or complementary to white-collar/high-skilled workers (e.g.
Acemoglu, 1998).
Some further evidence tend to suggest that exchange rate effects are hetero-
geneous across industries with different market structure. The theoretical model
developed in Nucci and Pozzolo (2010, 2011) predicts that the exchange rate pass-
through elasticities contribute to influence the adjustment of labor-market out-
comes in response to currency shocks. A number of papers show that exchange
rate pass-through elasticities depend on market structure and in particular on the
extent to which products are differentiated and the substitution among different
variants (Yang, 1997). Studies such as Dornbusch (1987) and Knetter (1993) show
that the pass-through tends to be small if the degree of competition in the foreign
market is high. The lower the pass-through elasticities, the higher is the exchange
rate sensitivity of labor market outcomes.
Accordingly, the idea developed in Table 3.5 is to explore the influence of mar-
ket structure on shaping the response of wages to exchange rate shocks. I use the
classification of product differentiation developed in Rauch (1996, 1999), which
identifies to what extent products are differentiated. The idea is that for differen-
tiated products, connections between buyers and sellers are not formed through
organized exchanges (i.e. markets) but rather through a search process which de-
pends on proximity and preexisting ties. This kind of search process is expected to
be costly, thus resulting in potentially persistent relationships once the best match
is achieved. This tends to be less true for homogeneous products, because they are
traded more on organized exchanges. I then expect that industries predominantly
producing goods that are described as differentiated would be less affected by ex-
change rate movements than those producing mainly homogeneous goods, because
of potentially higher pass-through elasticities.
Therefore, Table 3.5 presents regression results separately for industries ac-
cording to this attribute of market structure. Panel A shows estimation results for
workers employed in industries that predominately produce homogeneous goods,
whereas Panel B presents results when only looking at workers employed in indus-
tries that mainly produce differentiated varieties. The distinction is made based on
a modified version of the Rauch classification.27 As shown in column 1, wages of
workers employed in industries that predominantly produce homogeneous goods
seem to be more responsive than those working in more differentiated industries.
As suggested by the point estimates in column 1, the wage elasticity to exchange
27Available upon request.
3.6. THE EFFECT OF EXCHANGE RATES ON WAGES 85
rate movements is -0.162 for a hypothetical worker employed in an industry with
average values of foreign exposure; a 1% currency appreciation is related to a
0.16% wage increase.
Table 3.5: OLS estimates of exchange rate movements on wages within different
industry types (1996-2008)
Homogeneous Differentiated
(1) (2)
IPk,t−1 ×∆ERMk,t 0.017** 0.327
(0.007) (0.235)
XSk,t−1 ×∆ERXk,t -0.308* -0.032
(0.180) (0.173)
IPk,t−1 0.001*** 0.005*
(0.000) (0.003)
XSk,t−1 -0.070** 0.017
(0.034) (0.013)
∆ERMk,t -0.127 -0.385
(0.257) (0.625)
∆ERXk,t 0.121 -0.048
(0.129) (0.049)
Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Education FE Yes Yes
Sector × Year FE Yes Yes
Occupation FE Yes Yes
R-squared 0.343 0.160
F 15.828 25.684
N 2,229 12,138
No. Clusters 53 141
Notes: The dependent variables in all columns is the growth rate of
hourly wage. All regressions include a constant term and all control
variables that are included in Table 3.4 (not shown, but available on
request). Standard errors are clustered at the industry 4-digit level.
All regressions control for regional, year, education, industry 4-digit
level, occupation 4-digit level and 2-digit industry × year fixed effects.
Columns (1) shows results for workers employed in industries that pre-
dominantly produce homogeneous products. Column (2) shows results
for workers employed in industries that predominantly produce differ-
entiated products. The distinction is made thanks to a modified version
of the classification developed in Rauch (1996, 1999). * p≤0.10, **
p≤0.05, *** p≤ 0.01.
Sources: Own estimations based on merged BACII-SLFS database.
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper has explored the impact of industry-level exposure to trade and ex-
change rate shocks on individual-level wages of Swiss manufacturing workers over
the period 1996-2008. Trade shocks are stemming from exposure to import com-
petition or from exposure to export intensity. Exchange rate movements are con-
sidered as shocks either to the delivered price of foreign goods or to the offered
price of domestic outputs sold abroad. The manner how exchange rates at the in-
dustry level are constructed reflect the geographic composition of each industry’s
main import competitors and export markets.
Prior studies in the literature are unable to fully separate the impact of short-
term trade shocks from other changes in the labor market. As an attempt to address
this issue, I have proposed a gravity-type estimation strategy as a first-stage step
to construct instrumental variables designed to consistently estimate the causal ef-
fect of changes in trade on wages. In addition, I have focused on individual-level
data, which is particularly appropriate for studying the relationship between labor-
market outcomes, trade and exchange rate as analysis relying on more aggregated
data could miss heterogeneous effects in workers with different characteristics or
employed in different occupations. The individual-level information at hand en-
ables to analyze the impact of trade and exchange rates on wages of workers shar-
ing similar characteristics in many dimensions, as well as the effect within skill
groups, occupations and industry characteristics.
This study shows that industry real exchange rate movements and trade ex-
posure influence wages of manufacturing workers of various groups differently.
When averaged across all workers, the overall impact of trade on wages appears
small but statistically significant: a 10% increase in import penetration leads to
a drop of 0.39% in wages, while a 10% increase in the export share implies a
0.53% increase in wages. In contrast, exchange rates movements do not seem to
influence average wages. However, for some specific groups, effects can be larger.
The impact of import penetration ratios, export shares and exchange rates swings
are concentrated among high-skilled and blue-collar workers almost exclusively.
Overall, the net effect of trade shocks on wages is positive, ranging from an in-
crease of 0.42% for high-skilled workers’ wages to 0.66% for blue-collar workers’
wages after a rise of 10% in import penetration ratio and export share. Concerning
the effect of exchange rate fluctuations, the results imply an average exchange rate
elasticity of -0.22 among high-skilled workers: the effect of a 1% currency appre-
ciation on the hourly wage for a hypothetical high-skilled worker employed in an
industry with average import exposure is a 0.220% wage expansion, potentially
channeled through reductions in the cost of imported intermediate inputs. Con-
cerning blue-collar workers, the estimated elasticity of hourly wage to exchange
rate change is equal to 0.158. This means that the effect of a 1% currency de-
preciation on the hourly wage for a hypothetical blue-collar worker employed in
an industry with average foreign exposure is a 0.158% wage rise. These results,
highlighting the asymmetric effect of exchange rates on wages of workers of dif-
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ferent skills or employed in different occupations, are in line with the findings of
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003). One potential explanation is that a currency appre-
ciation puts pressure on costs which may push producers to invest in processes that
are substitutes to blue-collar/low-skilled workers and/or complementary to white-
collar/high-skilled workers (e.g. Acemoglu, 1998).
Exchange rate effects are potentially heterogeneous across industries with dif-
ferent market structures. Exchange rate pass-through elasticities have been shown
to depend on market structure and in particular on the extent to which products are
differentiated and the substitution among different variants. Preliminary evidences
show that wages of workers employed in industries that predominantly produce
homogeneous goods are more responsive to exchange rates movements than those
working in industries that predominantly produce more differentiated varieties.
Finally, it has to be highlighted that this study has some limitations. First,
I focus on changes within manufacturing industries only, therefore neglecting the
impact of trade and exchange rate shocks across the broader economy, which might
be larger (e.g. Ebenstein et al., 2014). Second, I am only able to capture the wage
effect for workers that remain employed in the manufacturing sector. I am thus
unable to gauge the wage consequence for workers switching out of manufacturing,
or for those that become unemployed.
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General Conclusion
International trade is typically believed to generate aggregate welfare gains for
trading countries. However, it also raises considerable debate as trade is also often
seen as a source of growing social disparity. As seen throughout this thesis, the
combination of recent features of the global economy, the availability of new de-
tailed data sets and new theories is a great opportunity to refine our knowledge of
the labor-market consequences of international trade.
In chapter 1, through theoretical simulations and empirical estimations, pure
intra-industry trade expansion is shown to be less disruptive than inter-industry
trade expansion. As intra-industry shares and outward processing trade are rising
over time, national economies are converging towards similar sector compositions.
Even though this is mainly true for high-income economies, the opening of low-
and middle-economies and the rapid convergence of technology across space could
suppose an intensification of the process leading to less trade-related disruptions to
the labor market.
In the second chapter, using a unique longitudinal dataset of individual worker
characteristics for the UK over an extended period of time, the recent surge in
Chinese exports and existing trade patterns with the EU are exploited in order
to analyze how UK manufacturing workers adjust to trade competition. While
trade competition from China is almost entirely driven by import growth in labor-
intensive sectors, UK trade patterns with the EU is characterized by the two-way
exchange of goods within similar industries. As a consequence, increased import
exposure from China leads to lower cumulative earnings, wages and hours of work
over the 15 year sample period for affected workers. On the contrary, increased
imports from the EU are associated with positive labor-market outcomes and may
have had a complementary effect to domestic production.
The third chapter is focused on the short-term impact of exposure to trade com-
petition and real exchange rate movements on wages in Switzerland. Complemen-
tary to chapter 2, the main findings are that exposure to trade and exchange rate
shocks have a mild influence on wages of Swiss workers. As expected, a rise in
import competition is associated with lower wages, while an increase in exports
boosts them. These impacts are especially stronger among high-skilled and blue-
collar workers than among other groups. Overall, the net effect of trade shocks
on wages is positive. In the same way, the impact of exposure to exchange rate
fluctuations is shown to be heterogeneous across jobs types, education groups and
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industry with different market structures.
The growing importance of emerging countries, the fragmentation of modes of
production, and the shift of the center of gravity of global manufacturing produc-
tion networks towards the south-east of the globe is not likely to reassure exposed
workers. It may indeed contribute to public ambivalence toward globalization and
specific anxiety about increasing trade with countries such as China. However,
some emerging economies are already specializing in more complex products,
climbing the ”quality ladder”of production. With production capacities and orga-
nization becoming more and more similar to those of industrialized countries, the
intensification of merchandise trade could therefore be accompanied with milder
trade-related shocks to high-incomes countries’ labor market in the future. Or at
least, I would presume that the rapid development of communication techniques,
the automation of tasks of ever growing complexities, and the popularization of
disruptive modes of production like the 3D-printer, will change the way we think
the labor market in more profound ways than any other things.
Appendix A
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A.1 Extra figures
Figure A.1: Simulated employment effects of trade liberalization in the compara-
tive disadvantage industry
Source: Own simulations based on the model of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007).
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A.2 Extra tables
Table A.1: Parameter values used in simulations
Parameters Name Theoretically
possible val-
ues
Values re-
tained for
comparative
statics
Values re-
tained for
the baseline
simulation
τi Variable trade
cost
[1,∞) [1, 2] [1, 1.6]
fie Fixed entry
cost
(0,∞) [2, 4] 2
fi Fixed produc-
tion cost
(0,∞) (0, fix] 0.1
fix Fixed export-
ing cost
(0,∞) [fi, 1.1] 0.1
βi Factor intensity (0.5, 1) (0.5, 1) β1 = 0.6, β2 =
0.4
αi Industry expen-
diture share
[0.5, 1) [0.5, 1) α1 = α2 = 0.5
k Minimum pro-
ductivity
(0,∞) [0.2, 1.2] 0.2
σ Elasticity of
substitution
(1,∞) [1.85, 4.39] for
a = 3.4
3.8
a > σ − 1 Firm disper-
sion
a > σ − 1 [2.85, 8] for
σ = 3.8
3.4
LH/SH Relative factor
endowment
(0, 1] [0.5, 1) 0.833
(LF+SF )
(LH+SH)
Relative coun-
try size
(0,∞) [0.44, 22] 1
Notes: The value ranges considered are consistent with diversified equilibria (i.e.
both sectors within each country produce non-zero output; no complete special-
ization). β2 = 1 − β1, and countries are mirror images, so varying β1 between
0.5 and 1 captures every possible scenario. α2 = 1 − α1, and countries are mir-
ror images, so varying α1 between 0.5 and 1 captures every possible scenario.
LH/SH = SF /LF .
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B.1 Extra figures
Figure B.1: The proportion of total trade between the UK and China, 1988-2012
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries.
Figure B.2: Trade between the US and China, 1989-2012
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
 C
on
st
an
t P
ric
es
 (B
illio
ns
 20
05
 G
BP
)
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
calendar year
Exports to China Imports from China
Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries.
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Figure B.3: The proportion of total trade between the US and China, 1989-2012
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries.
Figure B.4: The proportion of total trade between the UK and the EU, 1988-2012
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Notes: The EU consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries.
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Figure B.5: Trade between the US and the EU, 1989-2012
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries. The
EU contains the UK.
Figure B.6: The proportion of total trade between the US and the EU, 1989-2012
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
.
3
Sh
ar
e 
of
 U
S 
Ex
po
rts
/Im
po
rts
 to
/fr
om
 E
U1
5
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
calendar year
Proportion of Exports to EU15 Proportion of Imports from EU15
Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries. The
EU contains the UK.
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Figure B.7: The change in imports from China to the US, 1996-2011
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries.
Figure B.8: The change in imports from the EU to the US, 1996-2011
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries. The
EU contains the UK.
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Figure B.9: The nature of trade between the US and China, 1989-2012
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries. The
EU contains the UK.
Figure B.10: The nature of trade between the US and the EU, 1989-2012
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Source: Using data from UN Comtrade for 166 consistently defined manufacturing industries. The
EU contains the UK.
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Figure B.11: The share of manufacturing employment in the UK, 1994-2011
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1994-2011
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B.2 Extra tables
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics
Main Earnings Sample Main Earnings Sample
for China and EU Im-
ports
Trade Exposure 1997-2011
(∆China Imports)/UK Consumption96 0.0593 (0.0942) 0.0592 (0.0939)
P10-P90 Interval [0.0007, 0.1910] [0.0007, 0.1910]
P25-P75 Interval [0.0026, 0.0597] [0.0026, 0.0597]
(∆EU Imports)/UK Consumption96 0.0492 (0.2052)
P10-P90 Interval [-0.0600, 0.1683]
P25-P75 Interval [-0.0004, 0.0877]
(China Imports96)/UK Consumption96 0.0064 (0.0659) 0.0064 (0.0659)
(EU Imports96)/UK Consumption96 0.1923 (0.2944)
(Non-China Imports96)/UK Consumption96 0.3443 (0.4847) 0.3442 (0.4847)
Instruments 1992-2011
Import penetration from China to High Income
Countries
0.3979 (0.5140) 0.3978 (0.5140)
P10-P90 Interval [0.0094, 1.1374] [0.0094, 1.1374]
P25-P75 Interval [0.0225, 0.5769] [0.0225, 0.5769]
Import penetration from the EU to rest of OECD 0.2735 (0.8407)
P10-P90 Interval [-0.1579, 0.8478]
P25-P75 Interval [-0.0001, 0.4095]
Dependent Variables
Cumulative Annual Earnings 14.687 (25.336) 14.687 (25.337)
Years of Non-Zero Earnings 6.311 (4.627) 6.311 (4.627)
Cumulative Annual Earnings/Year 3.495 (5.176) 3.795 (5.176)
Cumulative Hourly Pay 17.392 (26.106) 17.392 (26.107)
Cumulative Hours of Work 10.297 (11.616) 10.296 (11.616)
Worker Characteristics
Female 0.255 (0.436) 0.255 (0.436)
Age 34.902 (8.174) 34.902 (8.175)
Employees in Firm 1-99 0.263 (0.440) 0.263 (0.440)
Employees in Firm 100-499 0.270 (0.444) 0.270 (0.444)
Employees in Firm 500-999 0.123 (0.328) 0.123 (0.328)
Employees in Firm ≥ 1000 0.343 (0.475) 0.343 (0.475)
Job Tenure 0-1 Year 0.149 (0.356) 0.149 (0.356)
Job Tenure 2-5 Years 0.318 (0.466) 0.318 (0.466)
Job Tenure 6-10 Years 0.499 (0.500) 0.499 (0.500)
Job Tenure ≥ 11 Years 0.034 (0.182) 0.034 (0.182)
Average Log Wages 1990-1996 7.529 (2.477) 7.528 (2.477)
Number of Observations 19,949 19,946
Notes: As per Table 2.3. The table provides the mean (standard deviation) and [percentile interval].
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B.3 Mapping trade products to industries: from SITC re-
vison 3 to UKSIC 1992 revision
The aim is to carry out extensive analysis using trade data classified by the UK
Standard Industrial Classification, revised in 1992 (UKSIC(92)) at the finest, five-
digit level of disaggregation. The original trade data are classified according to the
Standard International Trade Classification, revision 3 (SITC rev3).
To perform such a correspondence, we used one existing official (administra-
tive) concordance table that matches 8-digit Combined Nomenclature 2002 codes
(CN 2002) with 6-digit Classification of Products by Activity 2002 codes (CPA
2002), with 6-digit Harmonized System 2002 (HS 2002) and also with 5-digit SITC
rev3 (SITC3) codes. Therefore, CN 2002, and at a lesser extend HS 2002, serve
as ”proxy” classifications that linked SITC3 to UKSIC(92). Indeed, CPA 2002 is
identical to NACE 1.0, on which UKSIC(92) is built. Therefore, CPA 2002 and
UKSIC(92) are identical up to the 4-digit level (with some exceptions).
This CN-HS-CPA-SITC concordance table was built by EuroStat by putting
in correspondence several existing official tables. The concordances were created
by electronic means and have not been thoroughly checked or validated by any
organization or working party. As a consequence no guarantee can be given as to
their full reliability. However, it is a valuable starting point and it serves as an input
file which forms the skeleton of the SITC3-UKSIC(92) concordance.
The strategy is then based on two steps. The first step is to build a correspon-
dence table going from SITC3, at five-digit, to CPA 2002, at 6-digit using infor-
mation from CN-SITC3, CN-CPA, HS-SITC3 and HS-CPA tables. Some SITC3
products couldn’t be fairly allocated to a single 6-digit CPA code, so some SITC3
products are matched to a 5-digit CPA code. In cases where it was needed to
improve the appropriateness and precision of the allocation, we also used an addi-
tional table that linked 8-digit (and not 6-digit as before) HS 2002 codes to 6-digit
CPA codes.
The second step involves converting those 6-digit CPA codes to 5-digit UK-
SIC(92) activities. With few exceptions, CPA 2002 and UKSIC(92) are identical
up to the fourth digit. As a consequence, and again with few exceptions, 6-digit
CPA codes within any fourth digit, are embedded, by construction, within the cor-
responding UKSIC(92) 4-digit activity. From that, we can allocate the vast major-
ity of 6-digit CPA codes to 5-digit UKSIC(92) activities (see below for the list of
exceptions).
The result gives 3121 SITC Rev.3 codes each with a given 5-digit UKSIC(92)
match; 283 sectors in total (251 are manufacturing sectors; the remaining 32 sectors
are mainly comprised into ”Mining and Quarrying”).
B.3.1 Limitations
No SITC products are left unmatched but two exceptions; SITC codes 91100
(postal packages not classified according to kind) and 93100 (special transactions
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and commodities not classified according to kind) have no corresponding codes
with CPA 2002 or even with different revisions of HS and CN classifications.
Therefore, those codes have a corresponding UKSIC missing code represented by
”.” in the concordance table.
Unfortunately, not every UKSIC(92) manufacturing sectors are matched. In-
deed, the list below shows the ones that are not:
• 17.13: preparation and spinning of worsted-type fibres;
• 17.23: worsted-type weaving;
• 22.21: printing of newspaper;
• 22.23: bookbinding and finishing;
• 22.25: Other activities related to printing;
• 22.3: reproduction of recorded media;
• 27.35: Other first processing of iron and steel not elsewhere classified; pro-
duction of non-ECSC ferro-alloys;
• 27.5: casting of metals;
• 28.4: forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal; powder metal-
lurgy;
• 28.5: treatment and coating of metals; general mechanical engineering;
• 33.3: industrial process control equipment;
• 37: recycling.
The main reason for the non-matching (except for codes 17.13, 17.23 and
27.35) is that the corresponding CPA codes (thus identical to UKSIC(92)) have
been found to have no match at all with any HS or CN classification, since they
mainly consist of related services linked to the corresponding activities (see the
CPA 2002 structure). For codes 17.13 and 17.23, the reason is that the SITC3 clas-
sification does not distinguish between worsted-type fibres and other fibres made
with other techniques. For code 27.35, we decided to allocate those to code 27.10;
we did that as a matter of consistency across the different correspondence and cor-
relation tables built. To be more precise, 27.35 no longer exists in UKSIC(2003),
it is allocated into 27.10. Therefore in the correspondence table matching sectors
from UKSIC(2003) to UKSIC(1992), 27.35 cannot be matched since it is incorpo-
rated into 27.10 in UKSIC(2003).
Moreover, 10 4-digit UKSIC(92) manufacturing sectors could not be broken
further down into their fifth digit because of the SITC3 classification nature. Those
sectors are:
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• 15.13: production of meat and poultry meat products;
• 15.93: manufacture of wines;
• 15.94: manufacture of cider and other fruit wines;
• 23.20: manufacture of refined petroleum products;
• 24.30: manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink
and mastics;
• 25.23: manufacture of builders’ ware of plastic;
• 29.12: manufacture of pumps and compressors;
• 33.20: manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, check-
ing, testing, navigating and other purposes, except industrial process control
equipment;
• 33.30: industrial process control equipment;
• 36.50: games and toys.
Finally, two pairs of 4-digit UKSIC(92) sectors have to be grouped together,
again because of the SITC3 classification nature, it was impossible to distinguish
them one from the other. Those sectors are:
• 15.81 and 15.82 grouped together into code number 15.81 in the table;
• 26.63 and 26.64 grouped together into code number 26.63 in the table.
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B.4 Mapping industries consistently: from UKSIC 2007
revision to UKSIC 1992 revision
Because the UKSIC classification has been updated twice since the 1992 version,
we need to work with one consistent industry classification for all available years.
The aim is to concord industries classified according to the 2007 or 2003 UKSIC
versions into the 1992 UKSIC version. The classification has been revised in 2003
and 2007 (and one minor revision in 1997). The 2003 revision was not a full-
scale change, so its structure is still tightly linked to the 1992 revision. In 2007,
however, the structure of the classification has been revised in depth leading to
major changes. So, we proceed first by mapping UKSIC 2007 industry codes to
UKSIC 2003 ones and then we map UKSIC 2003 industry codes to corresponding
UKSIC 1992 codes.
B.4.1 From UKSIC 2007 to UKSIC 2003
The crosswalk table is heavily built on the one provided by the Inter-Departmental
Business Register (IDBR) from ONS. The ONS last update was done in December
2009 and no further updates are expected.
The table is a weighted correlation table that maps any UKSIC(2007) code to
at least one corresponding UKSIC(2003) code at the 5-digit level. The weighted
correlation table shows the level of change that might be expected at UKSIC level
in employment data, turnover data (see the section ”limitations”) and the number
of business in percentage format following implementation of UKSIC(2007).
The table is based on data taken from the IDBR, which contains information on
VAT traders and PAYE employers in a statistical register comprising of over 2 mil-
lion enterprises. This dataset relates to a snapshot of VAT and/or PAYE registered
businesses on the IDBR, taken in December 2009.
Some minor modifications have been made to the original IDBR table. Indeed,
some UKSIC(2007) industries are absent from the original table and, thus, have
been included in the current table for a matter of completeness. Those industries
are:
• 01150: Growing of tobacco;
• 01230: Growing of citrus fruits;
• 01260: Growing of oleaginous fruits;
• 01280: Growing of spices, aromatic, drug and pharmaceutical crops;
• 05200: Mining of lignite;
• 07210: Mining of uranium and thorium ores;
• 10810: Manufacture of sugar;
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• 17110: Manufacture of pulp;
• 24460: Processing of nuclear fuel;
• 64110: Central banking;
• 84210: Foreign affairs;
• 84230: Justice and judicial activities;
• 84240: Public order and safety activities;
• 84300: Compulsory social security activities;
• 97000: Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel;
• 98100: Undifferentiated goods-producing activities of private households
for own use;
• 98200: Undifferentiated service-producing activities of private households
for own use;
• 99000: Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies.
Part of those sectors include some in which UK does not produce anything (i.e.
mining of uranium and thorium ores, growing of oleaginous fruits) and some that
were apparently protected by ONS (so the weights were not computed). In order to
find at least one corresponding UKSIC(2003) match, we double-checked our priors
with a raw correspondence table provided by Eurostat and a UKSIC(2007) detailed
alphabetical index, provided by ONS, for which corresponding UKSIC(2003) codes
were provided (without weights, so it is a m-to-m correspondence table).
For example, for 16 out of the 18 above-mentioned industries, we could iden-
tify a 1-to-1 match, therefore having a 100% weight in the table. For the other two
(codes 01260 and 01280), there is more than 1 plausible match, thus we had to
weight them according to their corresponding UKSIC(2003) ”frequency” matches.
To be more specific, let us introduce an example on how the correspondence is pre-
sented in the alphabetical index. The example is for UKSIC(2007) code number
01280 (Growing of spices, aromatic, drug and pharmaceutical crops):
UKSIC(2007) code: source UKSIC(2003) code: target
01280 01110: Pharmaceutical crops growing
01280 01110: Plants used chiefly in pharmacy or
for insecticidal, fungicidal or similar pur-
poses
01280 01110: Drug and narcotic crops growing
01280 01110: Hop cones growing
01280 01120: Pepper growing
01280 01139: Spice crops growing
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01280 01139: Vanilla growing
01280 01139: Anise growing
01280 01139: Aromatic crops growing
01280 01139: Badian growing
01280 01139: Basil growing
01280 01139: Bay growing
01280 01139: Chilli growing
01280 01139: Chillies and peppers capsicum
sop. growing
01280 01139: Cinnamon growing
01280 01139: Clove growing
01280 01139: Coriander growing
01280 01139: Ginger growing
01280 01139: Nutmeg, mace and cardamoms
growing
So, UKSIC(2007) code number 01280 matches 14 times with UKSIC(2003)
code number 01139, 4 times with 01110 and once with 01120. Accordingly, the
weights are respectively 14/19, 4/19 and 1/19 in the table.
Turnover data weights for some industries were not provided by IDBR. Those
industries are UKSIC(2007) codes 64201, 64202, 64203 and 64204. Since those
industries are not from manufacturing and account for a small fraction of the indus-
try total in many respects, I’ve taken the arithmetic mean of the two other weights
to approximate them. Noteworthy, correlations between any two weighting scheme
are more than 98%.
B.4.2 From UKSIC 2003 to UKSIC 1992
The 2003 revision was not a major change; accordingly both classification struc-
tures at each level of disaggregation are tightly linked. The changes and modifica-
tions made to the 2003 revision are listed and available in an ONS PDF-format file.1
Therefore, we directly applied those changes without any further modification ex-
cept one. UKSIC(1992) code number 27350 no longer exists in the UKSIC(2003)
revision; this code is included into code number 27100. Therefore, it should be
noted that 27350 is absent from the UKSIC(1992) classification in the table and
integrated into code number 27100 as in the 2003 revision.
1File available on the ONS website.
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C.1 Extra tables
Table C.1: Descriptive statistics
mean sd p25 p50 p75 min max
Continuous variables: sample when estimating trade effect (22,633 observations)
Hourly Rate of Pay 40.97 32.52 30.12 37.00 46.71 5 2,188.0
Number of hours of work 39.56 8.907 40 41 42 2 95
Number of hours of work 1,860.4 418.9 1,880 1,927 1,980 90 4,465
Gross Annual Earnings 75362 46,300 55,890 70,440 89,790 200 1,922,461
Import Penetration 0.791 12.63 0.161 0.385 0.658 0.0004 92.19
Export Share 0.549 0.740 0.0967 0.420 0.813 0.0007 17.68
Export-weighted REER Index 106.8 3.887 104.2 106.4 108.9 33.79 119.6
Import-weighted REER Index 106.7 6.117 104.4 106.8 109.3 1.279 131.2
Industry average hourly wage 41.89 9.195 36.24 40.54 45.88 11.12 132.4
Age 40.56 11.61 31 40 50 16 64
Tenure (in years) 10.42 9.960 2.519 7.250 15.37 0.02 50
Dummy variables: (22,633 observations)
Married 0.590 0.492 . . . 0 1
Foreign 0.315 0.464 . . . 0 1
Women 0.284 0.451 . . . 0 1
Workers in Firm ≥ 20 empl. 0.747 0.435 . . . 0 1
Continuous variables: sample when estimating exchange rate movements effect (14.367 observations)
∆ERMk,t 0.0040 0.0205 -0.0095 0.0092 0.0173 -0.197 0.317
∆ERXk,t 0.0040 0.0648 -0.0092 0.0090 0.0189 -1.545 2.504
∆wt 0.0398 0.366 -0.0421 0.0146 0.0896 -5.419 4.994
∆hourst 0.0042 0.234 -0.0030 0 0.0030 -3.689 3.689
Source: Own calculations based on BACII-SLFS database.
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C.2 Conceptual base of the structural gravity model
This section follows similar developments done by Anderson and Yotov (2012),
Anderson and Yotov (2010a) and Anderson and Yotov (2010b). The structural
gravity model follows Anderson (1979) because it uses the assumptions of a CES
demand specification with product differentiation by place of origin (ı.e. Arming-
ton type). Further assumptions are the inclusion of budget constraints (one for each
destination in each sector) and market clearance equations (one for each origin in
each sector). I abstract from the time subscript t to ease notation. Let:
• To,d,k be the value of shipments at destination prices from origin o to desti-
nation d in sector k;
• to,d,k ≥ 1 be the variable trade cost factor on shipment of goods from origin
o to destination d in sector k;
• p∗o,k be the factor gate price. Hence, destination prices are p∗o,k × to,d,k;
• Ed,k be the expenditure at destination d on goods in sector k from all origins;
• Yo,k be sales of goods at destination prices from origin o in sector k to all
destinations.
Then, the demand function (for either final or intermediate goods) is given by:
To,d,k =
(
βo,kp
∗
o,kto,d,k/Pd,k
)1−σk Ed,k (C.1)
where βo,k is a share parameter at origin o in sector k, σk is the elasticity of sub-
stitution parameter for sector k; and Pd,k is the CES sectoral price index defined
as:
Pd,k =
[∑
o
(βo,kp
∗
o,kto,d,k)
1−σk
] 1
1−σk
. (C.2)
Market clearance implies, for each sector k:
Yo,k =
∑
d
(βo,kp
∗
o,k)
1−σk(to,d,k/Pd,k)1−σkEd,k (C.3)
Thus, defining Yk ≡
∑
o Yo,k, ”world expenditure shares” at the sectoral level
are generated by:
(βo,kp
∗
o,kΠo,k)
1−σk = Yo,k/Yk (C.4)
where
Πo,k ≡
∑
d
(to,d,k/Pd,k)
1−σkEd,k/Yk (C.5)
and the CES ”world” price index is equal to 1, because summing (C.4) yields:∑
o
(βo,kp
∗
o,kΠo,k)
1−σk = 1. (C.6)
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Next, use (C.4) to substitute for βo,kp∗o,k in (C.1), the market clearance in (C.3)
and the CES price index in (C.6). This yields the structural gravity model for each
time period t at the sectoral level k (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004):
To,d,k =
Ed,kYo,k
Yk
(
to,d,k
Πo,kPd,k
)1−σk
(C.7)
(Πo,k)
1−σk =
∑
d
(
to,d,k
Pd,k
)1−σk Ed,k
Yk
(C.8)
(Pd,k)
1−σk =
∑
o
(
to,d,k
Πo,k
)1−σk Yo,k
Yk
(C.9)
where Πo,k represents outward multilateral resistance and Pd,k represents inward
multilateral resistance (and is also the CES sectoral price index for the demand
system)1.
C.3 Mapping trade products to industries: from SITC re-
vison 3 to NACE revision 1.0
The aim is to carry out extensive analysis using trade data classified by the in-
dustrial classification of the European Union (Nomenclature ge´ne´rale des activite´s
e´conomiques dans les communaute´s europe´ennes), first revision, NACE Rev. 1
(NACE1) at the highest, fourth-digit level of disaggregation. The original trade
data are classified according to the Standard International Trade Classification, re-
vision 3 (SITC rev3).
To perform such a correspondence, I used one existing official (administrative)
concordance table that matches 8-digit Combined Nomenclature 2002 codes (CN
2002) with 6-digit Classification of Products by Activity 2002 codes (CPA 2002),
with 6-digit Harmonized System 2002 (HS 2002) and also with 5-digit SITC rev3
(SITC3) codes. Therefore, CN 2002, and at a lesser extend HS 2002, serve as
“proxy” classifications that linked SITC3 to NACE1. Indeed, CPA 2002 is identical
to NACE 1.0 up to the fourth-digit level (with some exceptions).
This CN-HS-CPA-SITC concordance table was built by EuroStat by putting
in correspondence several existing official tables. The concordances were created
by electronic means and have not been thoroughly checked or validated by any
organization or working party. As a consequence no guarantee can be given as to
their full reliability. However, it is a valuable starting point and it serves as an input
file which forms the skeleton of the SITC3-NACE1 concordance.
The strategy is then based on two steps. The first step is to build a correspon-
dence table going from SITC3, at five-digit, to CPA 2002, at 6-digit using infor-
mation from CN-SITC3, CN-CPA, HS-SITC3 and HS-CPA tables. Some SITC3
1See Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003).
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products couldn’t be fairly allocated to a single 6-digit CPA code, so some SITC3
products are matched to a 5-digit CPA code. In cases where it was needed to im-
prove the appropriateness and precision of the allocation, I also used an additional
table that linked 8-digit (and not 6-digit as before) HS 2002 codes to 6-digit CPA
codes.
The second step involves converting those 6-digit CPA codes to 4-digit NACE1
economic activities. With some exceptions, CPA 2002 and NACE1 are identical
up to the fourth digit. From that, I can allocate the vast majority of 6-digit CPA
codes to 4-digit NACE1 activities (see below for the list of exceptions).
The result gives us 3121 SITC Rev 3 codes each with a given 4-digit NACE1
code; 253 sectors in total, among which 221 are manufacturing sectors. The re-
maining 32 sectors are mainly comprised into “Mining and Quarrying”.
C.3.1 Limitations
No SITC products are left unmatched but two exceptions; SITC codes 91100
(postal packages not classified according to kind) and 93100 (special transactions
and commodities not classified according to kind) have no corresponding codes
with CPA 2002 or even with different revisions of HS and CN classifications.
Therefore, those codes have a corresponding NACE missing code represented by
“.” in the concordance table.
Unfortunately, not every NACE1 manufacturing sectors are matched. Indeed,
the list below shows the ones that are not:
• 17.13: preparation and spinning of worsted-type fibres;
• 17.23: worsted-type weaving;
• 22.21: printing of newspaper;
• 22.23: bookbinding and finishing;
• 22.25: Other activities related to printing;
• 22.3: reproduction of recorded media;
• 27.35: Other first processing of iron and steel not elsewhere classified; pro-
duction of non-ECSC ferro-alloys;
• 27.5: casting of metals;
• 28.4: forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal; powder metal-
lurgy;
• 28.5: treatment and coating of metals; general mechanical engineering;
• 33.3: industrial process control equipment;
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• 37: recycling.
The main reason for the non-matching (except for codes 17.13 and 17.23) is
that the corresponding CPA codes (thus identical to NACE1) have been found to
have no match at all with any HS or CN classification, since they mainly consist of
related services linked to the corresponding activities (see the CPA 2002 structure
for more details). For codes 17.13 and 17.23, the reason is that the SITC3 classifi-
cation does not distinguish between worsted-type fibres and other fibres built with
other techniques.
Finally, two pairs of 4-digit NACE1 sectors have to be grouped together, again
because of the SITC3 classification nature, it was impossible to distinguish them
one from the other. Those sectors are:
• 15.81 and 15.82 grouped together into code number 15.81 in the table;
• 26.63 and 26.64 grouped together into code number 26.63 in the table.
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